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I. INTRODUCTION
In our American society, unemployment insurance fulfills many
roles and bears many names. For the social historian, unemployment
insurance is a deserved safety net for those who were once members of
the working class and now need temporary government assistance to
prevent impoverishment.' An economist would add that unemploy-
ment compensation programs are a form of social insurance which
help to stabilize the economy by assuring that there is no permanent
underclass of needy made up of the temporarily unemployed. How-
ever, a business owner may very well believe that unemployment
insurance is merely another form of welfare, doled out to those unable
to hold a job, and thus an unfair burden on commerce and business
owners.
The historical and current primary purpose of unemployment
insurance is to provide for those who were once significantly attached
1. See generally 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
445-73 (1938) [hereinafter ROOSEVELT PAPERS]. President Roosevelt, arguably the creator of
the modem unemployment insurance program, strongly advocated the need for some form of
insurance for the maintenance and support of men and women during times of involuntary
unemployment. Id. at 454.
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to the labor market who become unemployed through no fault of their
own. 2 In his Address on Unemployment Insurance in New York City
on March 6, 1931, President Roosevelt specifically recognized the
need of social insurance to reflect the changing nature of human
experience:
What impresses me most is that insurance as a whole is a con-
stantly changing and a constantly growing force in our individ-
ual lives and in our business lives... In the various demands
which are made by worthy citizens for the protection of business
and individuals against new risks, one essential basis for all
insurance is often forgotten. I refer to the fundamental principle
that insurance must, if it is to survive, be based on human
experience.3
However, as our labor market has changed, our unemployment
insurance programs have not.4 Unemployment insurance, as currently
implemented in the United States, is a very gender-oriented system.5
Although our workforce is now nearly half female, and the proportion
of women which constitute the unemployed has risen as well, 6 unem-
2. See generally Evelyne M. Burnes, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Economic
Objectives, 55 YALE L.J. 1, 8-9 (1945); Elizabeth F. Thompson, Comment, Unemployment Com-
pensation: Women and Children-The Denials, 46 MIAMI L. REV. 751, 759 (1992). See e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73-108(1)(a) (1999) ("it is the intent of the general assembly that the
division at all times be guided by the principle that unemployment insurance is for the benefit of
persons unemployed through no fault of their own; and that each eligible individual who is
unemployed through no fault of his own shall be entitled to receive a full award of benefits");
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 100 (West 1999) ("The Legislature therefore declares that in its con-
sidered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the State require the
enactment of this measure under the police power of the State, for the compulsory setting aside
of funds to be used for a system of unemployment insurance providing benefits for persons
unemployed through no fault of their own, and to reduce involuntary unemployment and the
suffering caused thereby to a minimum."); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 8-102(4)(c) (1999)
("The General Assembly declares that, in its considered judgment, the public good and the gen-
eral welfare of the citizens of the State require the enactment of this title, under the police powers
of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit
of individuals unemployed through no fault of their own."). See also Advisory Council on
Unemployment Insurance: Report and Recommendations 1 (1994) [hereinafter ACUC Report
I] stating that the unemployment insurance system serves as the foundation of economic security
for millions of workers who are temporarily laid off or permanently lose their jobs.
3. See ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 1, at 453.
4. Amy B. Chasanov, Part I: Unemployment Compensation and Eligibility: Clarifying Con-
ditions for Nonmonentary Eligibility in the Unemployment Insurance System, 29 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 89 (1995) in 1 Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation: Background
Papers 15 (1995). See also ACUC Report I, supra note 2, at 5.
5. See generally Deborah Maranville, Changing Economy, Changing Lives: Unemployment
Insurance and the Contingent Workforce, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 291 (1995) [hereinafter Maran-
ville, Economy].
6. Young-Hee Yoon et al., Unemployment Insurance: Barriers to Access for Women and
Part-Time Workers, National Commission for Economic Policy Resources, Rep. No. 95-06, at 42
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ployment insurance fails to provide for the needs of women in the
labor force. For example, part-time workers and members of the
service industry, both groups predominantly made up of women,7 are
often not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits due to
hour and wage qualification requirements of state unemployment
insurance schemes! When attachment to the labor force is measured
by a minimum number of work weeks required, more than twice as
many women than men fail to be eligible for state unemployment
insurance (twenty percent of women as compared to eight percent of
men).9
Women face an additional hurdle when they do qualify for
unemployment insurance benefits. For individuals who voluntarily
leave jobs, unemployment insurance is only available to those who
leave for "good cause" reasons." Leaving work to take care of domes-
tic or family obligations, a task routinely left to women in two-parent
families and single mothers," is not considered "good cause" in most
states.12 Additionally, while domestic violence predominately affects
(July 1995). This report indicates that women's labor force participation increased from 33% in
1948 to 59% in 1994. Additionally, women made up 46% of the unemployed in 1994 as com-
pared to 29% of the unemployed in 1949. See also U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletins
2217, 2307, and 2340, in U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES, Table Nos. 652 and 653 (118th ed. 1998) [hereinafter ABSTRACT] (indicating that
59.8% of women in 1997 participated in the labor force-67.9% of married women, 61.6% of
single women, and 48.6% of women with spouse absent). See also ACUC Report I, supra note 2,
at 5.
7. See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept of Labor, 1998, unpublished tabu-
lations, in THE WORLD ALMANAC (1999) at 150 (indicating that women made up 69.3% of
part-time workers in 1998); Anne E. Polivka, 119 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 10-14 (Oct. 1996)
(indicating temporary workers are 53% women); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment
Earnings, Jan. 1998, in ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at Table No. 672 (indicating that women made
up 60.1% of all service workers in 1983 and 59.4% in 1997).
8. Yoon et al., supra note 6, at 25-26.
9. Id. at 26.
10. See, e.g., Chasanov, supa note 4, at 95, comparing various "good cause" categories of
quits. State statutes generally use the good cause terminology for voluntary quits but the reader
should note that this good cause requirement evolved from the traditional requirement that eligi-
bility for unemployment compensation turned upon the question of whether the employee had
become unemployed through no fault of his or her own. Historically, if the employee has vol-
untarily quit a job, then the reasons for quitting must be related to the work situation and be no
fault of the employee, i.e., the employee must not have left because of frivolous personal reasons
which he or she had control over. Only no fault reasons would be considered good cause to
voluntarily leave employment. It is easy to confuse the related concepts of good cause and no
fault.
11. BARBARA R. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 256-58 (1986).
See also ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLU-
TION AT HOME (1989); Chasanov, supra note 4, at 16.
12. Chasanov, supra note 4 at 9; see also Maranville, Economy, supra note 5, for a discussion
of how unilateral employer changes in employee work schedules that conflict with domestic
duties may also affect eligibility for unemployment insurance after a voluntary quit.
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women, 3 individuals who leave work to obtain safety from an abusive
partner or stalker are generally not considered as having a good cause
reason to leave employment.14 Although a domestic violence or stalk-
ing situation is no fault of the victim, and a claimant for unemploy-
ment insurance under such dangerous circumstances has become
unemployed through no fault of her own, in most states a woman
must resort to welfare assistance in order to provide for her family and
herself. 5
Some states, such as Arkansas and Pennsylvania, have attempted
to fill this gap in unemployment insurance eligibility by resorting to
the courts. 6 However, a few states have recognized that reliance on
the courts and the discretion of individual judges is an inadequate
remedy and will not provide a long-term solution for domestic vio-
lence advocates and survivors. These states have enacted legislation
that provides unemployment insurance benefits in limited circum-
stances to domestic violence survivors who leave work to obtain
safety. 17
This paper focuses on the unemployment compensation statutes,
administrative law decisions, and the case law of Washington state
and proposes that domestic violence creates involuntary unemploy-
ment and should, therefore, be considered a compelling good cause
situation for provision of unemployment compensation benefits. Title
50 of the Revised Code of Washington, which provides the structure
and provisions of unemployment compensation eligibility, should be
liberally construed by agency officials and courts or amended so as to
13. The U.S. Department of Justice estimates that 24.8% of women, as compared to 7.6%
of men, have been raped and/or physically assaulted by an intimate partner. U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 191 (1999)
[hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
14. Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation, Unemployment Insurance in the
United States: Benefits, Financing, and Coverage 91-100 (1995) [hereinafter ACUC Report II],
summarizing the survey by the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies
(ICESA).
15. Yoon et al., supra note 6, at 42 (finding that only eleven percent of working women
welfare recipients received unemployment compensation, relying instead on welfare as a "poor
woman's unemployment insurance.")
16. See, e.g., Bacon v. Commonwealth, 491 A.2d 944 (Pa. 1985) (holding contrary to over-
whelming majority of case law in the states, that the cause of a voluntary quit need not be related
to job for employee to remain eligible for unemployment insurance benefits); Rivers v. Stiles, 695
S.W.2d 938 (Ark. 1985) (establishing that the existing statutory "Personal emergency" exemp-
tion to disqualification for unemployment insurance benefits after a voluntary quit applies to
domestic violence situation, thus providing benefits to the claimant).
17. California, Maine, New Hampshire, Connecticut, New York, North Carolina, Colora-
do, Wisconsin, New Jersey, Oregon, and Wyoming each have specific provisions that provide
benefits to claimants who leave work to escape domestic violence. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS.
CODE § 1256 (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. § 1193-1A(4) (West 1999); N.H. STAT.
ANN. § 82A-A:321(a)(3) (West 1998).
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provide unemployment compensation benefits to victims of domestic
violence who leave work to obtain safety.
Part II of this paper illustrates how the terms of unemployment
compensation eligibility, both in Washington and other states, are
defined and how those terms have traditionally been interpreted. I
will demonstrate how these terms have a gendered perspective and
have historically been utilized to include men and traditional male-
oriented jobs within the protection of the unemployment compensa-
tion scheme and exclude women and traditional female-oriented jobs
from the economic safety net of the unemployment compensation
scheme. Although current legislation does not make the distinction
between male and female applicants for unemployment insurance, this
type of legislation predominantly affects women, thereby correcting
short-sighted unemployment insurance laws that prevented women
from obtaining benefits in domestic violence situations.
Part III offers statistics of how domestic violence affects the
workplace, both nationally and within the states. This part of the
paper also examines how the terms of the unemployment scheme, as
currently written in Washington and other states, have been inter-
preted to provide benefits in favor of domestic violence victims. Part
IV illustrates how other states, in recognition of the connection
between domestic violence and unemployment, have enacted domestic
violence legislation to provide unemployment compensation to
domestic violence victims. Finally, in Part V, I propose similar legis-
lation for Washington, weigh the pros and cons of such legislation,
and discuss the current efforts at such legislation.
II. THE CONDITIONS OF UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION ELIGIBILITY
All unemployment compensation schemes in the United States
include both monetary and nonmonetary eligibility requirements.18
These requirements are specifically outlined in the statutory provi-
sions of the unemployment compensation program of each state and
are subject to judicial and agency interpretation. Monetary require-
ments provide that, before unemployment, the claimant must either
have worked a certain number of hours or have earned a certain sum
of money, or both, during a certain specified period of time called a
"base year" or "base period." 9 These requirements are not waivable.
18. See, e.g., Chasanov, supra note 4, at 89.
19. See Sharon Dietrich et al., Violence and the Workplace: Exploring Employee Rights and
Remedies, 467 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 161 (Special Issue 1994) (noting that eligibility for unem-
ployment benefits is based on an individual's earnings during a "base year" or a "base period," a
[Vol. 23:797
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If an individual has not earned enough money or worked long enough
to qualify for unemployment insurance then benefits are summarily
denied. All but nine states ignore earnings in the two most recent cal-
endar quarters when defining the term "base year.",21 Monetary
requirements assure that an individual has significant attachment to
the labor force prior to unemployment, thus fulfilling a primary his-
torical purpose of unemployment insurance.21
In contrast, nonmonetary requirements provide that a claimant
must not have been fired for misconduct, or that a claimant who has
voluntarily quit a job or refused a job during unemployment must
have done so with good cause. 22 Historically, nonmonetary require-
ments were designed to limit payment of benefits only to workers who
became or remained unemployed primarily through no fault of their
own.23 However, these nonmonetary requirements were altered since
unemployment insurance was first implemented in the United States
and generally now only include unemployment situations that are no
fault of the employer or are work-related. 24 For example, until RCW
one-year period of time within which an individual's wages are counted toward establishing
monetary eligibility). For example, WASH. REV. CODE § 50.04.020 (1998) provides that in order
for an individual to be eligible for unemployment compensation benefits, the individual must
have worked at least 680 hours in the past base year, which is either the first four or the last four
of the last completed calendar quarters.
20. These nine states include MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151A, § 1(a) (West 1999);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 421.46 (1995); MINN. STAT. § 268.04(2) (West 2000); N.Y. LAB. LAW §
520 (McKinney 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-19(c)(10) (West 1999); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4141.01(Q) (Anderson 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-42-3(10) (1999); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1301(17) (1999); and WASH. REV. CODE § 50.04.020 (1998).
21. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 759.
22. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.379(b)(2) (Michie 1999); WASH. REV. CODE §
50.20.080 (1998).
23. See, e.g., Chasanov, supra note 3; Maranville, Economy, supra note 5. See also, Matison
v. Hutt, 85 Wash. 2d 836, 837, 539 P.2d 852, 853 (1975) (emphasizing that the "good cause"
requirement "reflects the concept common to the unemployment compensation statutes of vari-
ous states that benefits are to be available to those unemployed through no fault of their own.").
See also Roosevelt Papers supra note 1, at 453.
24. See, e.g., Chasanov, supra note 4. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-16-009(1) (1999) inter-
prets the good cause provision of RCW 50.20.050(1) to mean that an individual must satisfacto-
rily demonstrate
(a) That he or she left work primarily because of a work connected factor(s); and (b)
That said work connected factor(s) was (were) of such a compelling nature as to cause
a reasonably prudent person to leave his or her employment; and (c) That he or she
first exhausted all reasonable alternatives prior to termination: Provided, That the
individual asserting good cause may establish in certain instances that pursuit of the
otherwise reasonable alternatives would have been a futile act, thereby excusing the
failure to exhaust such reasonable alternatives.
See also ACUC Report I, supra note 2, at 31-40 stating the recipiency rate of unemployment
insurance has dropped dramatically between 1940 and 1980 due to tightening limitations on eli-
gibility.
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50.20.050 was amended in 1977, good cause was not limited solely to
work-connected factors.25
Currently, the type of circumstances that are legitimate good
cause situations to quit employment are limited and exclude most per-
sonal reasons for leaving employment. 26  Discussion of what consti-
tutes good cause to leave employment in various states has included
sexual harassment in the workplace,27 significant change in working
conditions, medical disabilities caused or exacerbated by working
conditions,29 and child care responsibilities.3" Limiting good cause to
nonpersonal reasons for quitting employment places a significant bur-
den on unemployment insurance claimants. Although the claimant
may have worked for many years and fulfilled the monetary require-
ments for eligibility, a life and death domestic violence situation is not
statutorily considered good cause, nor have most courts interpreted a
25. See Washington Laws of 1977, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 33, sec. 4; In re Bale, 63 Wash. 2d 83,
385 P.2d 545 (1963). The amended good cause exception no longer covers the circumstances pre-
sented in In re Bale and Ayers v. Department of Employment Sec., 85 Wash. 2d 550, 536 P.2d
610 (1975), in which the employee's quitting employment in order to follow a spouse to a new
residence was held to be good cause as a compelling personal reason under the predecessor to
RCW 50.20.050. Instead, the circumstances in In re Bale and Ayers would be covered by the
current exception of RCW 50.20.050(2)(c), which provides a claimant remains eligible for bene-
fits if he or she left work to relocate for the spouse's employment which is outside the labor mar-
ket.
26. See, e.g., ACUC Report II, supra note 14, at 122, n.ll (indicating that 32 states
disqualify claimants who leave jobs to perform domestic obligations). But see Reep v. Commis-
sioner of Dep't of Employment and Training, 593 N.E.2d 1297 (Mass. 1992) (finding that
although a former employee was not married to her partner of thirteen years, this did not pre-
clude a determination that she had "urgent, compelling and necessitous" reason to leave
employment to follow her partner to bona fide work).
27. See Diana M. Pearce & Monica L. Phillips, When Sexual Harassment Happens: State
Unemployment Insurance Coverage of Workers Who Leave Their Jobs Because of Sexual Harass-
ment, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 75 (1994).
28. See, e.g., Director, Dep't of Indus. Relations, State of Alabama v. Ford, 700 So. 2d
1388 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (finding that a claimant who had closed business of which he was
both president and employee had good cause to quit his employment and was eligible for unem-
ployment compensation because he knew his business was failing and the bank would foreclose
on the mortgage).
29. See, e.g., Department of Indust. Relations v. Henry, 172 So.2d 374 (Ala. Ct. App.
1965) (holding that a claimant who suffered from pulmonary emphysema which developed from
the flu which he caught while working outside selling products from door to door had good cause
connected to work for quitting where employment required him to be outside, carry heavy
objects and make long walks).
30. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 760; In re L.P., Docket No. 9-09225 (Wash. Employ-
ment Sec. Dep't, commissioner's decision 1982) (finding that single father who quit his job to
take care of children after learning his oldest daughter had been skipping school and another
daughter had been arrested for shoplifting was eligible for benefits under the "domestic respon-
sibilities" provision of RCW 50.20.050(4) but had to submit to the ten week waiting period
before benefits were allowed).
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domestic violence situation to constitute a good cause reason to quit
employment.
A. Ms.B
Ms. B was a resident of Washington when her personal and pro-
fessional life underwent a frightening change for the worse.31 Ms. B
was a college professor whose husband of twenty years had repeatedly
threatened her at home and had begun to stalk her at her workplace.32
The public could easily access the college buildings, and Ms. B's hus-
band constantly left threatening messages at work and on occasion
came to her office and threatened her with violence.33 Ms. B's hus-
band also stole the car that she used to get to work and attempted to
thwart her efforts at economic independence.34 Finally, in front of
friends and family, Ms. B's husband threatened to kill her.3" He also
stated that she couldn't "be surrounded all the time" by those who
might protect her.36 Because Ms. B's husband had demonstrated he
could easily reach her at home and work, had stolen her car, and had
gained access to her office, Ms. B fled for her safety. She left a resig-
nation note that same week and temporarily moved out of the state.37
Ms. B's initial application of unemployment benefits was denied
by the Commission of the Washington Employment Security Depart-
ment (ESD) and again, on appeal, by an administrative law judge at
the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), on the grounds that
the domestic abuse was not work-connected and thus was not a good
cause reason to leave employment. 3' An appeal to superior court
resulted in a reversal of the decision and a remand for another hear-
ing.39 Ms. B prevailed in her second OAH hearing not because
domestic violence is sufficiently work-connected, thus good cause to
justify the voluntary quit, but because the court found the domestic
31. Middleton v. Employment Sec. Dept., No. 95-2-02078-7 (Wash. Employment Sec.
Dep't Office of Admin. Hearings, July 1, 1996). For safety reasons, the name of the plaintiff has
been changed, as well as her occupation and a few factual details. Domestic violence decisions in
Washington are difficult to find. ESD and OAH have not published any decisions relating to
domestic violence, although many have been decided. For this reason, only cases that reach the
superior court level or above can be located. (Case on file with the Seattle University Law
Review).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Petitioner's Brief at 2, Middleton v. Employment Sec. Dep't, No. 95-2-02078-7 (Wash.
Employment Sec. Dep't Office of Admin. Hearings, July 1, 1996).
39. Id.
2000]
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abuse Ms. B suffered effectively disabled Ms. B so as to necessitate
quitting her job.4" Essentially, the court ruled that the domestic
violence of the type that Ms. B experienced was a disability, entitling
her to unemployment benefits under RCW 50.20.050(2).41
This ruling is both hopeful and dangerous. It is hopeful in the
sense that Washington courts and administrative judges are beginning
to recognize the compelling situations that victims of domestic vio-
lence are in when they quit jobs to obtain safety from their abusers.
The ruling is also dangerous because it establishes domestic violence
as a "disability" rather than a good cause reason to quit work. Allow-
ing a judge to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a claimant's
domestic violence was serious enough to disable a claimant and neces-
sitate the quit from a job removes this decision from the claimant. If a
claimant realizes that a judge may not find her situation life-threaten-
ing enough to constitute disability, the claimant may feel she has no
choice but to remain where she is, accessible to her abuser and suscep-
tible to further danger.
Only because Ms. B's situation was so frightening and her hus-
band's threats and acts so high in number did Ms. B qualify for a dis-
ability exemption under Washington's unemployment compensation
laws. The administrative judge in Ms. B's second hearing stated that
Ms. B was eligible because she had taken such "drastic action," leav-
ing employment, "only after years of abuse, failed counseling and
other attempts to find support and remedy [sic] through support
groups, family friends and law enforcement and the justice system."42
Must a woman in a domestic violence situation exhaust all other
remedies before she leaves employment to find safety in order to qual-
ify for unemployment insurance? Must a woman be trapped in such a
severe pattern of domestic violence that it actually endangers her life
to satisfy a judge that the domestic violence constitutes a disability?
Must a woman choose between her job and her life? In Washington,
the answer may be yes.
40. Id.
41. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2) (1998) provides that
An individual shall not be considered to have left work voluntarily without good cause
when: ... (b) The separation was because of the illness or disability of the claimant or
the death, illness, or disability of a member of the claimant's immediate family if the
claimant took all reasonable precautions, .. . to protect his or her employment
status ...
42. Middleton, No. 95-2-02078-7 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't Office of Admin.
Hearings, July 1, 1996).
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B. The History and Purpose of Unemployment Insurance
The Social Security Act of 1935 created our nation's unemploy-
ment insurance program.43 The act established a dual system of state
and federal unemployment compensation laws and was brought about
primarily because of the overwhelming numbers of unemployed
caused by the economic depression of the 1930s.44 The act was also a
response to the reality that many workers who joined the war effort in
the early years of World War II would soon become unemployed.45
During its formative years, the unemployment compensation system
was mainly geared toward the needs of the "primary wage earners,"
men who wanted and needed full-time work, but also included
women. 46
The unemployment compensation system of the United States is
called a dual system because it is a federal-state program where each
state determines its own eligibility requirements with some minimal
requirements imposed by federal regulations. 47  Specific state regula-
tions and interpretations of those state regulations create and imple-
ment unemployment insurance across the nation.4" Although the
historical federal purpose of the unemployment insurance program
was to provide benefits to those who became unemployed due to eco-
nomic factors beyond their control and beyond the control of employ-
ers, this focus has either been superseded or supplanted by the
purposes of the various state systems holding the power to enact and
regulate the unemployment compensation programs.
43. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 636 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
1101-1109 (1994)).
44. Id. See, e.g., Joseph E. Hight, Unemployment Insurance: Changes in the Federal-State
Balance, 59 U. DET. J. URB. L. 615 (1982); Arthur Larson & Merrill G. Murray, The Develop-
ment of Unemployment Insurance in the United States, 8 VAND. L. REV. 181 (1955); Edwin E.
Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 21 (1945). See generally Eve-
lyne M. Burns, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Economic Objectives, 55 YALE L.J. 1
(1945).
45. See, e.g., Larson & Murray, supra note 44; ACUC Report I, supra note 2, at 5.
46. See, e.g., Larson & Murray, supra note 44; ACUC Report 1, supra note 2, at 5. See also
Chasanov, supra note 4, at 122-23 (emphasizing that the labor force in 1935 consisted mostly of
men who worked full-time).
47. 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (a)(5) (1994) prevents states from denying benefits to eligible claim-
ants who refuse to accept ajob when ajob is vacant due to a strike or lockout, job wages, hours or
conditions that are substantially less favorable than those for similar work in the same area, or
where an individual would be required to join or not be permitted to join a company union. This
statute also prevents the denial of benefits solely on the basis of pregnancy. See, e.g., Wiberly v.
Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511 (1987).
48. All fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have
some form of unemployment compensation program. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to
these entities collectively as states, unless I am referring to a specific program within a specific
political boundary.
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
The primary purpose of Washington state's unemployment
compensation scheme, like most state schemes, is found in the pream-
ble to the Washington Employment Security Act, RCW 50.01."
Washington's unemployment compensation scheme created a "com-
pulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the
benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own."5 The
act further mandates that the provisions of the title should "be liber-
ally construed for the purpose of reducing involuntary unemployment
and the suffering caused thereby to the minimum."'
')
In 1944 the Washington Supreme Court reinforced the historical
purpose of Washington's unemployment compensation scheme by
holding that the purpose of the unemployment compensation act was
to reduce unemployment and economic insecurity due to unemploy-
ment, and that in order to effectuate that purpose a liberal construc-
tion of the act was required. 2 The mandate for a liberal construction
of the act to provide for reducing involuntary unemployment was
repeated in 197653 and 1992.) However, current interpretations of
Washington's unemployment compensation program are not in con-
gruence with this mandate of liberal interpretation.
In other states, the historical purpose of unemployment compen-
sation is quite similar to Washington's.5 However, eligibility stand-
ards in other states have also narrowed since their inception in the
early 1940s. For example, a recent New Jersey Supreme Court deci-
sion held that claimants who voluntarily quit, electing for early retire-
ment when management announced the General Motors (GM) plant
49. WASH. REV. CODE§ 50.01.010 (1998).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See In re Yakima Fruit Growers Ass'n, 20 Wash. 2d 202, 146 P.2d 800 (1944).
53. See Kenna v. Employment Sec. Dept., 14 Wash. App. 898, 545 P.2d 1248 (1976)
(holding an individual's eligibility for unemployment compensation must be determined on the
specific facts of his case and in light of the legislative mandate that provisions of the Employment
Security Act are to be liberally construed to reduce involuntary unemployment and the resulting
suffering to a minimum as per § 50.01.010).
54. See Tapper v. Employment Sec. Dept., 66 Wash. App. 448, 832 P.2d 136 (1992), rev'd
on other grounds, 122 Wash. 2d 397, 858 P.2d 494 (1993) (holding that Washington's unem-
ployment compensation law is to be liberally construed to alleviate suffering caused by involun-
tary unemployment).
55. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 43:21-2 (West 1999). § 43:21-2 outlines the statutory mis-
sion of New Jersey's unemployment insurance act and stating, in part, "[T]he public policy of
this state is declared to be as follows: economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious
menace to the health, morals and welfare of the people of this state. Involuntary employment is
therefore a subject of general interest and concern which requires appropriate [Legislative]
action ... " This public policy was later supported by Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, 100
A.2d 277 (N.J. 1953) (affirming that the underlying mission of the act was "to afford protection
against the hazards of economic insecurity due to involuntary unemployment.").
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they worked at would be closing, were ineligible for unemployment
compensation. 6 Although GM had emphasized that the plant closure
was irreversible, the court found that the claimant's decision to quit
rather than be laid off did not constitute good cause because the lay-
offs were only possible, and the claimants were never actually laid off
(they had volunteered for early retirement). 7 The claimants failed to
demonstrate they had a "subjective fear of imminent lay off based on
definite objective facts."5" Essentially, the claimants carried the bur-
den to show that even though GM told them their plant was closing,
they had to know they were going to be laid off before they would be
eligible for unemployment benefits.
C. Nonmonetary Terms of State Unemployment Insurance Programs
As discussed above, nonmonetary requirements for unemploy-
ment benefits eligibility include both preunemployment and postun-
employment circumstances. 9 First, in order to qualify for unemploy-
ment insurance benefits, a claimant usually must become unemployed
due to work-related or other good cause factors. In addition, the
claimant must be able to work, available for work, and actively seeking
suitable future employment in order to remain eligible for unemploy-
ment insurance. These requirements limit the ability of a domestic
violence survivor to leave work and regroup a life destroyed by abuse.
This article focuses on the good cause requirement for voluntary
quits and the requirement that a claimant be "able, available and
actively seeking" employment during the period of unemployment in
order to remain eligible. These are the two primary barriers a domes-
tic violence survivor must overcome to obtain and maintaining unem-
ployment insurance. Although only briefly addressed in this
Comment, the reader must also keep in mind a third nonmonetary
eligibility requirement: that a claimant who refuses "suitable"
employment must have good cause to do so.6"
56. See Brady v. Board of Review, 704 A.2d 547 (N.J. 1997).
57. Id. at 559.
58. Id.
59. See infra Section II.
60. Suitable employment in some states may exclude employment that a claimant is not
qualified to do, or employment that requires the claimant to take a substantial cut in previous
earnings or work below his or her qualifications. Suitable work is often also defined as full-time
work, which limits options for individuals who traditionally work part-time, such as individuals
with substantial domestic responsibilities. See, e.g., Chasanov, supra note 4; Maranville, Econo-
my, supra note 5. These articles address, in part, the good cause requirement for refusing suitable
employment and also discuss the gendered perspectives of this requirement and its substantial
effect on those seeking part-time employment, primarily women.
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1. Eligibility and "Good Cause" Requirement
All state statutes provide that a worker may not voluntarily leave
her job except for good cause. In many states, good cause for a vol-
untary quit generally is limited to only work-related situations.
61
Some states also provide that certain nonwork-related situations, such
as leaving work to care for the health of a seriously ill family member
62
or to accompany a spouse to a new job,63 is good cause. However,
most statutes either explicitly or implicitly specify, through agency
and court rulings, that any personal reasons for leaving employment
are not good cause.64 Personal circumstances typically include lack of
childcare during working hours,61 illness of child or family member,
66
or other domestic obligations.67 Because domestic violence includes a
variety of these situations, it is a "personal circumstance" by default.
Thirty-eight states restrict good cause for a voluntary quit to
issues connected with work or attributable to the employer. 6' For
instance, Arizona excludes from its good cause provision nonwork-
related circumstances such as the illness of a child69 and lack of trans-
portation to work.
Only six states specifically provide in statute or regulation that
good cause includes personal circumstances of either a compelling or
substantial nature so as to necessitate a quit.7' Another twenty-five
61. See, e.g., Chasanov, supra note 4, at 9. See also Richard McHugh & Ingrid Kock,
Unemployment Insurance: Responding to the Expanding Role of Women in the Workforce, 27
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1422 (1994).
62. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(1) (1998) (a claimant may have a good cause
reason for a voluntary quit if the claimant voluntarily quits due to the illness of claimant or a
family member to take care of family member).
63. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(3) (1998); Reep v. Commissionerof Dep't of
Employment and Training, 593 N.E.2d 1297 (Mass. 1992).
64. See, e.g., Chasanov, supra note 4.
65. Id. at 125.
66. Id. at 124.
67. Id.
68. The 38 states include the following: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-4-78 (1975); ARK. CODE ANN. 11-10-
513 (Michie 1999); 1999 Alaska Sess. Laws 23.30.378; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-775 (1999). See
also Chasanov, supra note 4, at 8.
69. See Lara v. Arizona Dept. of Econ. Sec., 565 P.2d 1287 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
70. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-775-1 (1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-513(b) (Michie
1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73-108 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-706(a)(II) (West 1999);
MD. CODE ANN. [Labor and Employment] § 8-1001(c)(1)(ii) (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 151A, § 25(e) (West 1999). Other states, while having no specific statutory or legislative
language, allow individuals to show that good cause exists where claimants face compelling and
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states allow a claimant to argue good cause when he or she quits due to
illness.7 However, because domestic violence situations are usually
classified as personal circumstances,12 and not an illness, they would
generally not qualify as a good cause reason to quit in the majority of
jurisdictions today.
2. "Able, Available, and Actively Seeking" Requirement
The general requirement that an unemployed claimant be "able,
available, and actively seeking" work in order to continue receiving
benefits demonstrates that a primary purpose of unemployment insur-
ance is to provide for the welfare of an unemployed individual and the
individual's family while the claimant is searching for other suitable
work.73 All states require that a claimant be available and seeking
work in order to qualify for unemployment benefits.74 This mandate
encompasses the requirement that a claimant be available for suitable
work.7" If a claimant is not looking for suitable work, the claimant
either becomes ineligible for benefits for a certain amount of time or
forfeits benefits altogether. In at least one state, "suitable" work is
limited to a search for full-time work; part-time work is not considered
suitable.76 Additionally, some states define "suitable" work as that in
necessitous circumstances that provide no alternative to leaving employment. See, e.g., Molenda
v. Thomsen, 772 P.2d 1303 (N.M. 1989) (claimant did not show that employer speaking to her
in loud voice was a compelling and necessitous circumstance of such magnitude so as to leave her
no alternative but to quit employment); Stevenson v. Morgan, 522 P.2d 1204 (Or. Ct. App.
1974) (good cause for leaving employment exists when external pressures are so compelling that a
reasonably prudent person, exercising ordinary common sense and prudence, would be justified
in quitting work under similar circumstances).
71. Those states are Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Some states also provide that other specific circumstances
may be "good cause" for a voluntary quit. See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405-601(B) (West
1999) (sexual harassment at work is considered 'good cause' to leave employment); KAN. STAT. §
44-706(a)(1) (Supp. 1999) (good cause to leave employment includes illness of worker or family
member, leaving to join armed forces, or leaving to follow a spouse when transferred to another
work location).
72. See, e.g., Chasanov, supra note 4.
73. See generally Chasanov, supra note 4; Thompson, supra note 2; Maranville, Economy,
supra note 5; WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.010 (1998) (requiring that claimant, in order to be
eligible for benefits, must be "ready, able, and willing, immediately to accept any suitable
work.., and must be actively seeking"); Tapper v. State Employment Sec. Dept., 122 Wash. 2d
397, 858 P.2d 494 (1993) (holding that a chief purpose of unemployment compensation is to
provide support for unemployed workers as they seek new jobs).
74. See Chasanov, supra note 4, at 106-10.
75. See generally Chasanov, supra note 4; Thompson, supra note 72; and Maranville, Econ-
omy supra note 5.
76. See IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-14-3(a)(3) (West 1999). See also National Employment
Law Project, Analysis of State Unemployment Compensation Availability for Work
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which an employee earns at least eighty percent of the employee's past
wages, thus effectively restricting employment opportunities in part-
time work.77
Thus, for victims of domestic violence who successfully argue
their initial eligibility for benefits, the subsequent difficulty surround-
ing the "able, available, and actively seeking" requirement is twofold.
First, a victim of domestic violence who has fled her abuser has to
regroup her life. She has to search for housing, medical assistance, and
care for her children. She cannot immediately look for work and may
be disqualified for not being able, available, and actively seeking. Sec-
ond, a victim of domestic violence, often female,78 may be limited by a
requirement that only full-time work is suitable work. Due to her
obligations to herself and her uprooted family, she may not be able to
immediately work full-time. In order for a domestic violence survivor
to regroup, reestablish stability, and become employable, an exemp-
tion to the able, available, actively seeking requirement should apply
for a short period of time.
D. Gendered Perspectives
The unemployment insurance system, as written and interpreted,
is not only unfavorable to victims of domestic violence, it is also unfa-
vorable to women as a whole. Maranville asserts that the laws of our
country, although they attempt to treat different groups equally by
applying the same terms and conditions to each, have been structured
primarily by men to fit male life patterns.79 In essence, the terms of
the law fit a "norm" that is essentially male. In the field of unem-
ployment insurance, the presumed norm of the working individual is
reflected in the requirements of eligibility. Most unemployment
insurance schemes are structured around the needs of a full-time
worker who works at one job for several years, and who has few
Requirements When Work Search Is Limited to Part-Time Work (Oct. 25, 1994) (unpublished
data, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter NELP
Review]. The NELP Review asserts that because of certain restrictions and requirements in
unemployment compensation laws regarding hours worked or wages earned, eligibility for
unemployment insurance generally does not occur for claimants seeking part-time work in at
least forty states.
77. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 72-1366(9) (1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 421.29(6)(a)
(West 1999).
78. See Bergman, supra note 11, at 256.
79. See Deborah Maranville, Feminist Theory and Legal Practice: A Case Study on Unem-
ployment Compensation and the Male Norm, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1081, 1085 (1992) [hereinafter
Maranville, Theory].
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domestic responsibilities. This hypothetical worker mirrors the sta-
tistics of men generally in our society,8" but excludes most women. 81
1. Gender Specific Jobs and the Unemployment
Compensation Scheme
Unemployment compensation schemes primarily benefit full-
time workers, and those who work in management and government
positions. These positions are heavily weighted by men and are con-
sidered male-dominated.82 In contrast, the positions which often are
not covered by unemployment insurance are those that include part-
time or contingent workers,83 usually those in child or elderly care,
low-level health care providers, and maintenance staff.84 All of these
areas of work are heavily weighted by women.8"
The reason that the unemployment insurance scheme splits
between these two groups-full-time, permanent employees and part-
time, contingent workers-is that the eligibility terms of the unem-
ployment compensation scheme usually define an eligible individual
as one who either works a minimum amount of hours or earns a mini-
mum amount during a base period, or both.86 As men statistically fill
most full-time positions and earn more money than women, these
80. At age 45-65 years, men had their current job for 10.4 years compared to 8.4 years for
women. HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR STATISTICS, Table 1.42, Median Years of Tenure with
Current Employment (3d ed. 1999). Women continue to be the primary care givers in a family,
despite their increasing labor force participation. See Chasanov, supra note 4, at 16; see also
ACUC Report I, supra note 2, at 3-S.
81. See, e.g., Mary E. O'Connell, On the Fringe: Rethinking the Link Between Wages and
Benefits, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1421 (1993) (providing an overview of gender-based assumptions
underlying unemployment insurance programs).
82. See, e.g., Anne E. Polivka, A Profile of Contingent Workers, 119 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
3, 10-14 (Oct. 1996) (indicating that temporary workers are 53% female, 25% under the age of 25,
and 22% African-American); Francoise J. Carre, Temporary Employment in the Eighties, in NEW
POLICIES FOR THE PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORKFORCE 50 (Virginia du Rivage ed.,
1992) (finding that women account for 64.2% of all temporary workers). See also Inst. for
Women's Pol'y Research, The Economic Impact of Contingent Work on Women and Their Fami-
lies, RESEARCH IN BRIEF (Sept. 1995) at 2 (defining contingent workers as those workers who
worked full-time for part of a year for more than one employer, and those who worked part-time
for a full year while mixing self-employment with wage or salary work). Thus, the IWPR report
did not count those who were "permanent" part-timers, who worked part-time for the same
employer throughout the year. The IWPR report found that women hold 60% of contingent
jobs.
83. See generally Maranville, Theory, supra note 79; Chasanov, supra note 4; Sharon
Dietrich et al., Symposium, Work Reform: The Other Side of Welfare Reform, 9 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 53 (1998).
84. Deitrich et al., supra note 83, at 54.
85. See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, at Table No. 672
in ABSTRACT, supra note 6. For instance, women made up 96.8% and 94.9%, respectively, of in-
home child care providers and home cleaners in 1997.
86. See infra Part II.
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requirements reflect the traditional gendered perspective that men are
the primary "breadwinners" and women who fulfill other roles in the
job market are only secondary income earners, thus neither needing
nor desiring unemployment benefits.8 7
However, this historical perspective does not mirror the reality of
today's work force."8 Women now make up fifty-nine percent of the
work force, as compared to thirty-three percent in 1948, thirteen years
after unemployment insurance was formed. 9 Additionally, according
to various studies, women make up between fifty-three and sixty-four
percent of all temporary workers." Women are also likely to be the
primary breadwinners, as approximately eighty-two percent of all sin-
gle-parent families in 1997 were headed by women.91 In sum, women
are entering the work force in larger numbers than ever before, and
they are entering as primary breadwinners of single-parent house-
holds. Although there are differences between the average work week
and type of job of most men and most women, the economic needs of
women for unemployment insurance are just as acute as the economic
needs of men who also support their families. The economic needs of
a woman who leaves work to obtain safety for herself and her family
from an abusive partner or stalker are of particular urgency. Although
she may be lucky enough to have a job that would otherwise qualify
her for unemployment insurance benefits to assist her during this dan-
gerous time, she generally cannot receive them.
2. "Good Cause" Requirements
As the daily realities of adult work lives remain heavily gendered,
many women are significantly disadvantaged by the structure of
unemployment compensation laws. Washington, like many states,
provides that good cause for a voluntary quit should be primarily
work-related.9 2 Work-related factors that are considered good cause
87. See, e.g., Maranville, Theory, supra note 79.
88. See, e.g., ACUC Report I, supra note 2.
89. See, e.g., Chasanov, supra note 4, at 123-25.
90. See, e.g., Polivka, supra note 82; Carre, supra note 82.
91. U.S. Bureau of the Census and unpublished data, in ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at Table
No. 83, Current Population Reports, p. 20-509. See also U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CUR-
RENT POPULATION REPORTS, HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS: March 1998, at
i. In 1998, there were 2.1 million father-child and 9.8 million mother-child family groups.
92. See infra Part II, section C2 (discussing various "good cause" reasons for leaving work).
See also WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(3) (1998) which states in part, "In determining under
this section whether an individual has left work voluntarily without good cause, the commis-
sioner shall only consider work-connected factors..." and WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 1921-6-
009(1) (1999), which states a claimant must satisfactorily demonstrate "(a) [t]hat he or she left
work primarily because of a work connected factor(s); and (b) [t]hat said work connected factor(s)
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may include a significant change in benefits, hours, and wages;93 ter-
mination without misconduct on the part of the employee (i.e., down-
sizing); and leaving work to accept a bona fide offer of work. Personal
circumstances, like domestic responsibilities and abuse in the home,
are not considered work-related in most states and are not, therefore,
considered good cause to leave employment.94
As previously discussed, domestic responsibilities and domestic
abuse are situations that primarily affect women.95 For example, while
68.3% of women in two parent families are employed, women have
the primary childcare responsibilities in seventy-eight percent of all
two-parent families97 and eighty-two percent of single-parent families
are headed by women.98 Domestic responsibilities relating to children,
such as illness of a child, childcare difficulties, and others, fall mainly
on the shoulders of women. However, by the terms of unemployment
compensation eligibility, domestic responsibilities are not good cause
reasons for voluntarily leaving employment. 99
In Washington and other jurisdictions, coworker violence and
sexual harassment by coworkers in the work place are considered
work-related situations and are good cause for leaving employment.10
Sexual harassment or violence at work is clearly work-related because
it occurs at work, affects job performance, and creates an unsafe envi-
ronment for employees.'O These provisions apply to all claimants
was (were) of such a compelling nature as to cause a reasonably prudent person to leave his or her
employment ....
93. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-16-009(c)(2) (1999); G & G Elec. & Plumbing
Dist. v. State Dep't of Employment Sec., 58 Wash. App. 410, 793 P.2d 987 (1990), rev. denied,
115 Wash. 2d 1023, 802 P.2d 125 (1990) (holding that the accumulation of job-related factors
was good cause for resignation without losing the right to unemployment benefits, even though
each factor alone is insufficient, when an employee resigned because the employee did not receive
an annual bonus or sick leave benefits and work-related stress caused deterioration of the
employee's health).
94. See Chasanov, supra note 4, at 124-25.
95. See, e.g., Bergmann, supra note 11, at 256. See also SOURCEBOOK, supra note 13.
96. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, News USDL 97-195, June 16, 1997, in AB-
STRACT, supra note 6, at Table No. 656.
97. Chasanov, supra note 4, at 16.
98. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 91.
99. See Chasanov, supra note 4, at 105-06.
100. See State v. Hussa, 34 Wash. App. 857, 664 P.2d 1286 (1983); see also Diana M.
Pearce & Monica L. Phillips, When Sexual Harassment Happens: State Unemployment Insurance
Coverage of Workers Who Leave Their Jobs Because of Sexual Harassment, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 75 (1994).
101. See, e.g., Blair v. Poythress, 440 S.E.2d 261 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that an
employee who voluntarily left work because her employer was physically abusive and had at one
time threatened to kill her had good cause for quitting work and was entitled to benefits); Associ-
ated Util. Svcs. v. Board of Review, Dep't of Labor and Indus., 331 A.2d 39 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 1974) (stating that the intentional harassment by the employee's supervisor created such
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who assert they have experienced sexual harassment or violence at
work, both women and men. By contrast, Washington courts and
most others, have not considered domestic violence, a type of violence
which predominantly affects women"0 2 and affects the cost of busi-
ness, 10 3 to be work-related or good-cause to quit.
To date, only eleven states have specific provisions for domestic
violence claimants." ° Arkansas provides unemployment insurance to
victims of domestic violence if the situation is a "personal emergency"
of such a compelling nature that it necessitates a quit. 0 5 A Minnesota
internal unemployment insurance agency policy provides unemploy-
ment insurance to victims of domestic violence. °6 Florida provides
benefits where the victim of domestic violence was fired for excessive
absenteeism due to injuries she received from her abusive husband. 10 7
The remaining states generally provide no benefits.'
Additionally, good cause for leaving employment is found in
some situations involving purely domestic responsibilities. These
decisions are important because domestic violence is often deemed a
personal or domestic reason for a quit. For instance, in Washington,
RCW 50.20.050(2)(c) provides that an employee who relocates to
accommodate his or her spouse's employment has good cause to vol-
"intolerable and abnormal working conditions that [the claimant] was justified in quitting...");
McPherson v. Employment Division, 591 P.2d 1381 (Or. 1979) (noting "[tihe workplace is the
setting of much of the worker's daily life..." and as a matter of law, a worker is not required to"sacrifice all other than economic objectives and, for instance, endure racial, ethnic, or sexual
slurs or personal abuse, for fear that abandoning an oppressive situation will disqualify the
worker from unemployment benefits.").
102. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 13.
103. See SHECHTER & GRAY, A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING AND EMPOWER-
ING BATTERED WOMEN, ABUSE AND VICTIMIZATION ACROSS THE LIFE SPAN 242 (1988).
Shechter and Gray assert that Bureau of National Affairs statistics show that employers spend
between $3 to $5 billion each year in lost work time, increased health care, higher turnover, and
lower productivity due to domestic violence. Id. at 242.
104. California, Maine, New Hampshire, Colorado, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Oregon, Wyoming, and Wisconsin.
105. See Rivers v. Stiles, 695 S.W.2d 938 (Ark. 1985).
106. Minnesota internal IU policy #94-03 at 1 (January 27, 1994) (on file with the Seattle
University Law Review).
107. Gilbert v. Department of Corrections, 696 So. 2d 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(finding a claimant did not voluntarily leave work but was discharged without considering the
good cause issue). But see Hall v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 697 So. 2d 541
(Fla. 1997) (holding that a victim of domestic violence who left work to protect herself and chil-
dren from an abusive husband did not have good cause to leave work and was thus ineligible for
unemployment compensation benefits).
108. See, e.g., Pagan v. Board of Review, 687 A.2d 328 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
But see Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation, Unemployment Insurance in the
United States: Benefits, Financing and Coverage (1995) at 91-100 (indicating that ten states
have policy directives allowing for benefits, benefits vary in an additional nine states, and in
thirty-one states domestic violence claimants are ineligible).
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untarily leave employment." 9 Other states have similar provisions in
their unemployment compensation schemes or have interpreted their
compelling personal reasons provisions to include just such a situa-
tion.110 However, relocating to escape abuse that follows a victim to
work is not "good cause."
In sum, although some situations that are purely domestic are
considered good cause for reasons of unemployment insurance eligi-
bility, domestic violence by itself usually is not. Other purely domes-
tic or personal situations are considered work-related due to the effect
the situations have on the employee's performance and workplace
safety."' These effects are similar to how domestic violence negatively
impacts a victim's work performance and threatens the safety of the
workplace. However, when domestic violence is routinely classified as
a problem that is not work-related it is not, therefore, good cause to
leave employment.
While some courts have chosen to provide victims of domestic
violence with unemployment benefits in limited circumstances, bene-
fits that many domestic violence victims so desperately need to escape
their abuser, legislation is necessary to remove the discretion of fact-
finders who determine eligibility on a case-by-case basis." 2 Only
when domestic violence is legislatively recognized as good cause to
leave employment will victims of domestic violence be assured of
some economic assistance other than welfare after leaving employment
to find safety for themselves and their children. However, even if
statutes begin to define domestic violence as a good cause reason to
leave employment, the claimant is still required to actively seek
employment during the period of unemployment. In order for
domestic violence survivors to reestablish themselves after fleeing
109. See, e.g., In re Bale, 63 Wash. 2d 83, 385 P.2d 545 (1963) (holding that a wife had
good cause to terminate her employment to move with her husband to his new place of residence
because it is the duty of a wife, in the absence of good reason for not doing so, to accompany and
live with her husband in a home he selects); Ayers v. Employment Sec. Dept., 85 Wash. 2d 550,
536 P.2d 610 (1975) (finding that the abandonment of employment by one spouse in order to
move to an area where the other spouse is employed may be a compelling personal reason that
constitutes good cause).
110. See, e.g., Reep v. Commissioner of Dep't of Employment and Training, 593 N.E.2d
1297 (Mass. 1992) (holding that a woman who left her job to move with her partner of thirteen
years, although unmarried, did not preclude determination that she had "urgent, compelling and
necessitous" reasons to leave her employment).
111. See, e.g., Dep't of Indust. Relations v. Henry, 172 So. 2d 374 (Ala. Ct. App. 1965);
Blair v. Poythress, 440 S.E.2d 261 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). But see MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-5-
513(A)(1)(a) (West 1999) (marital, filial and domestic circumstances and obligations shall not be
deemed good cause to voluntarily quit employment).
112. See infra Part II.B.
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their abusers, this requirement must not apply to claimants who have
successfully proven they left their jobs to escape domestic violence.
3. "Able, Available, and Actively Seeking" Requirement
As discussed previously, the eligibility requirement that a claim-
ant for unemployment insurance be able, available, and actively seek-
ing work exists in all state unemployment insurance compensation
programs. 113 This requirement provides benefits only while the claim-
ant seeks other work and helps to assure that the period of unemploy-
ment is as short as possible." 4
Even where unemployment compensation benefits would have
been otherwise provided, these benefits are not awarded when a claim-
ant is not able, available, [and] actively seeking work."' This means
that, in order to retain eligibility for unemployment benefits, the
claimant must immediately undertake a job search for suitable
employment." 6 However, this requirement fails to recognize the
needs of a claimant who bears the majority of the burdens of domestic
responsibilities in both two-parent and single-parent families." 7
Domestic responsibilities may be so overwhelming as to render a
claimant with little time to search for, much less accept, available
employment.
In addition, some studies estimate that due to statutory earnings
requirements, in at least forty states, suitable work actually only
includes full-time work."8 This requirement applies even when the
eligible claimant was previously employed part-time and can only
work part-time, 19 which is often the case for claimants who have
113. See, e.g., Chasanov, supra note 4, at 111-17.
114. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 39 Wash. 2d 356, 235 P.2d 303 (1951) (holding that a claim-
ant must make an effort to apply for, seek, and accept work of the same or equivalent pay and
type and that the burden of establishing rights to benefits is upon claimant).
115. See, e.g., Coleman v. Employment Sec. Dept., 25 Wash. App. 405, 607 P.2d 1231
(1980) (holding that an employment security commissioner's decision that an employee was
ineligible for benefits for seven weeks on the basis that she was not actively seeking work during
those weeks was not clearly erroneous or arbitrary or capricious).
116. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-4-78 (Supp. 1999), which states in part, "An individual
shall be disqualified for total or partial unemployment: (5) FAILURE TO ACCEPT AVAIL-
ABLE SUITABLE WORK, ETC. - - If he fails, without good cause, either to apply for or to
accept available suitable work..."
117. See infra Part II.C. See also Chasanov, supra note 4, at 123-26; Maranville, Economy,
supra note 5, at 297-306.
118. See generally NELP Review, supra note 76, and discussion infra Part II.C; see also
Chasanov, supra note 4, at 115-16.
119. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 762 (suitable work includes only full-time work even
when claimant was previously employed part-time and can only work part-time). See also Cha-
sanov, supra note 4, at 126 (indicating that unemployed women are more likely than unemployed
men to seek part-time work).
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domestic responsibilities in addition to work responsibilities. The
courts rationalize this strange result by reasoning that a claimant who
seeks only part-time work is restricting his or her employment oppor-
tunities. 121 If the claimant is restricting employment opportunities,
then he or she is not fully "available" for work. Ironically, the same
courts do not make the obvious reverse conclusion; a claimant who
seeks only full-time work is restricting his or her employment oppor-
tunities by not searching for part-time work as well. 121 The definition
of suitable work as encompassing only full-time employment ignores
the dynamics of the labor market, in which over fifty-nine percent of
women participate, 2' and in which part-time workers make up
twenty-six percent of all laborers in 1997.123
For domestic violence survivors, a requirement for the claimant
to make current and active efforts to seek suitable work is too burden-
some. Often these survivors are fleeing their abusers and making
attempts to go into hiding. These women often leave their homes
without any means of transportation, access to housing, or other fun-
damental supports necessary to find and hold down a job. Additional-
ly, requiring domestic violence victims otherwise eligible for unem-
ployment benefits to search for and take employment immediately
after fleeing an abusive situation jeopardizes the safety of the victim
and her family. A domestic violence victim must first have time to
reconstruct a life before she can reenter the work force.124
Some courts have expressed the opinion that the provisions of
unemployment compensation statutes purporting to provide economic
support for unemployed workers as they seek new jobs should be lib-
erally construed. 12  This could include exempting a domestic violence
120. See Chasanov, supra note 4, at 126.
121. See id. at 126-27.
122. See id. at 126.
123. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, January 1998, in AB-
STRACT, supra note 6, at Table Nos. 668, 669. See also Polivka, supra note 82; Carre, supra note
82 (indicating that women make up between 53% and 64% of all temporary workers).
124. To support the need for a proposed domestic violence good cause provision in current
Washington statutes, Washington's Unemployment Law Project Legislative Committee of 1998
itemized the necessary steps a victim of domestic violence must take in order to gain control of
her life after fleeing an abuser. These steps include immediate legal protections, emergency and
permanent housing search, transportation assistance, medical care and/or hospitalization, coun-
seling for victim and children, obtaining control over checking and credit accounts, reestablishing
documentation regarding medical care, tax information, birth certificates, and divorce and cus-
tody papers, enrolling children in new school system, and then finding a job. (Checklist and
contact numbers to the Unemployment Law Project on file with the Seattle University Law
Review).
125. See, e.g., Tapper v. State Employment Sec. Dept., 122 Wash. 2d 397, 858 P.2d 494
(1993); Baird v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 372 A.2d 1254 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1977).
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
survivor from work search requirements for a specified period of time
to help ensure safety of the worker and her family. This will help
make the survivor more employable through stabilization of her life.
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE WORKPLACE
One of the strongest arguments against providing unemployment
insurance benefits to victims of domestic violence who leave work to
obtain safety is that their home situation is not truly "work related."
However, domestic violence pervades a victim's workplace as well as
every aspect of the victim's home. Although national statistics are
scarce, at least one state study has shown that emotional abuse directly
affects the victim's work performance and physical abuse may prevent
the victim from leaving the home to go to work.126 Often, the abuser
harasses the victim at work, creating danger for coworkers and cus-
tomers. 127  Twenty percent of battered victims lose their jobs alto-
gether.12 Domestic violence affects everyone it touches.
A. Domestic Violence-A "Work-Related" Issue
The drafters of the federal bill H.R. 851129 focused on labor
statistics regarding women and their presence in the workforce. They
found that women will account for two-thirds of all new entrants into
the work force between 1998 and 2000.130 Currently, women make up
fifty-nine percent of the total labor market.1 31
The drafters of H.R. 851 also relied on several congressional
findings to show the connection between domestic violence and work
in the United States. 132  The drafters found that violence against
126. See New York City Services Agency Report on the Costs of Domestic Violence, in
New York State Department of Labor, Report to the State Legislature on Employees Separated
from Employment Due to Domestic Violence (Jan. 15, 1996) at 3 [hereinafter N.Y. Report] (on
file with the Seattle University Law Review). The N.Y. Report estimated that 54% of battered
victims miss at least 3 days of work, 56% of battered victims are late for work at least 5 days a
week, 28% of battered victims leave work early at least 5 days a month, and 75% of working bat-
tered women must use company time to call doctors, lawyers, shelters, counselors, family and
friends because they cannot do so at home. Id. at 3.
127. The N.Y. Report also estimated that abusive partners harass 74% of employed bat-
tered women at work. Id.
128. Shechter & Gray, supra note 103, at 242.
129. H.R. 851, 105th Cong. (1997) was proposed federal legislation which would have pro-
vided unemployment insurance to victims of domestic violence.
130. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1996 in Congressional Findings of H.R. 851. Congres-
sional Findings of Proposed House Bill, H.R. 851 (on file with the Seattle University Law
Review).
131. See, e.g., Chasanov, supra note 4.
132. See H.R. 851, 105th Cong. (1997).
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women is the leading cause of injury to women.'33 A woman in the
United States is more likely to be assaulted, injured, raped, or killed
by a male partner than by any other type of assailant. 34 In fact, some
reports used by the drafters of H.R. 851 estimated that ninety-five
percent of victims of domestic violence are women. 3 These statistics
established that domestic violence against women by male partners is
an issue of enormous magnitude in the United States; it is the leading
cause of injury to women.
The drafters of H.R. 851 discovered that violence against women
dramatically affects women's workforce participation. Over fifty per-
cent of battered women surveyed by the Bureau of Labor were har-
assed by their abuser at work, while twenty-five percent of battered
women surveyed lost a job due, at least in part, to the effects of
domestic violence.'36 A study conducted in New Jersey by Domestic
Violence Intervention Services, Inc., estimated that ninety-six percent
of the domestic violence victims surveyed had some type of problem
in the workplace as a direct result of their abuse or abuser.'37 A New
York survey reported that abusive spouses in New York City harassed
seventy-four percent of battered women at work, fifty-four percent of
battering victims miss at least three days of work per month, and fifty-
six percent are late to work at least five times per month. 3 ' Addi-
tionally, domestic violence costs employers in the United States
between three and five billion dollars annually in increased medical,
health, and leave expenses."'
In sum, domestic violence has moved away from the home and
into the work place. The leading cause of injury to women in the
United States is violence committed by an abusive male partner, 4 ' and
at least fifty percent of battered women have been harassed at work.'41
Domestic violence has a definite impact on the economy and the effi-
133. Department of Justice Report, 1996, in Congressional Findings of Proposed House
Bill, H.R. 851, supra note 130. The Department of Justice report estimated that intimate
partners commit more than one million violent crimes against women every year.
134. Id. at 1. See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SOURCE-
BOOK, supra note 13.
135. Congressional Findings of Proposed House Bill, H.R. 851, supra note 130, at 1.
136. See Bureau of Labor Statistics in Congressional Findings of H.R. 851, supra note 130.
137. Domestic Violence Intervention Services, Inc., NJ, 1996 Survey, in Congressional
Findings of H.R. 851, supra note 130.
138. New York City Victims Services Agency survey, 1996, in Congressional Findings of
H.R. 851, supra note 130.
139. Bureau of National Affairs estimate (1996), in Congressional Findings of H.R. 851,
supra note 130.
140. Id.
141. Id. See also Bureau of Labor Statistics in Congressional Findings of H.R. 851, supra
note 130.
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ciency of an employer's business. The cost of domestic violence mul-
tiplies when dangers to coworkers, missed days of work, increased
medical and health costs, and lateness of employees are considered.
By providing short-term unemployment insurance to a victim who
needs financial stability to leave her abuser, an employer would suffer
less financial loss overall. A victim of domestic violence would not
then be forced to choose between her life and her job in order to pro-
vide for her family.
The drafters of H.R. 851 emphasized the need for national
legislation to provide unemployment insurance benefits to victims of
domestic violence. They pointed out that the availability of economic
support is a critical factor in women's ability to leave abuse situations.
Over fifty percent of battered women surveyed in New York and New
Jersey stayed with batterers because they lacked resources to support
themselves and their children.'42 Additionally, a recent survey of state
unemployment compensation agency directors by the Federal Advi-
sory Council on Unemployment Compensation found that in thirty-
one states battered women who leave work as a result of domestic
violence do not qualify for unemployment benefits, either by express
legislation, agency policy, or judicial interpretation of legislation.'43
Recognizing the connection between domestic violence and
unemployment, some states have chosen to provide unemployment
benefits tb victims of domestic violence who leave work to obtain
safety. These states either (1) interpreted "serious illness" or "com-
pelling personal" exemptions to include domestic violence situa-
tions;' (2) established an agency policy to provide victims of
domestic violence with unemployment benefits, thus fulfilling the
primary purpose of unemployment compensation, which is to provide
benefits to those who are unemployed due to no fault of own;'4 5 or (3)
enacted legislation that recognized domestic violence as good cause to
leave employment.'46
142. Bureau of Labor Statistics in Congressional Findings of H.R. 851, supra note 130, at 1.
See also Domestic Violence Intervention Services, Inc., 1996 Survey, in Congressional Findings,
supra note 130.
143. See generally Chasanov, supra note 4, describing the ACUC Report II, supra note 14,
and results. My research here may differ slightly, as the ACUC report was based on a telephone
survey of the commissioner of each unemployment insurance agency in each state regarding what
the commission believed would be a likely outcome where a claimant for unemployment insur-
ance left work due to a domestic violence situation. This Comment relies on actual case law and
statutes.
144. See Rivers v. Stiles, 695 S.W.2d 938 (Ark. 1985); Gilbert v. Dep't of Corrections, 696
So. 2d 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
145. See Minnesota Unemployment Insurance Policy, supra note 106.
146. See supra note 17.
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B. Providing Benefits to Domestic Violence Victims Through
Reinterpretation of Current Unemployment Insurance Schemes
Interestingly, Washington courts have found that the legislative
intent expressed in RCW 50.01.010 to compensate those persons
involuntarily unemployed is neither clear, unambiguous, nor well
understood when considered together with the limited good cause
reasons enumerated by RCW 50.20.050.147 The specific limitations
seem to work a contrary result to the primary purpose of the statute by
excluding individuals who are, in fact, unemployed through no fault of
their own. As the unemployment compensation statutes of other
states have the same primary purpose as Washington's statute, the
same contrary result has been witnessed in other jurisdictions.'48 In
the case of domestic violence survivors otherwise eligible for unem-
ployment benefits, this result is distressing.
Courts could find domestic violence to be good cause to volun-
tarily leave unemployment under at least three theories. Under the
first theory, courts could find that domestic violence, although consid-
ered a domestic or personal situation, in some cases so affects the work
situation that the domestic situation becomes work-related and is good
cause to leave employment.'49 Second, where a statute provides a"compelling personal circumstances" exception to the bar on domestic
or personal situations,' domestic violence could clearly qualify as a"compelling personal circumstance." A final theory, outlined in the
case of Ms. B, would allow courts to find that although domestic vio-
147. See In re Bale, 63 Wash. 2d 83, 385 P.2d 545 (1963).
148. A striking example of this contradiction can be seen by comparing Hall v. Florida
Unemployment. Appeals Comm., 697 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1997), with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.3.021
(West 1999). The statutory policy of section 44.3.021 provides, in part,that
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals,
and welfare of the people of this state. Unemployment is therefore a subject of gen-
eral interest and concern which requires appropriate action by the Legislature to pre-
vent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushing force
upon the unemployed worker and her or his family... The Legislature, therefore,
declares that in its considered judgment the public good, and the general welfare of
the citizens of this state require the enactment of this measure ... for the compulsory
setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unem-
ployed through no fault of their own ....
Hall involved a woman who fled to protect herself and her children from her abusive hus-
band. Hall, 697 So. 2d at 542. Although the alcoholic husband had in the past beat the claimant
when he was drunk and had recently began to drink again, the court found the claimant's actions
did not constitute "good cause" under the family emergency exception. Id. at 544.
149. To date, no cases have held that domestic violence, by itself, is work-related.
150. Currently, only twelve states specifically provide a compelling circumstances excep-
tion to the general personal circumstances bar to eligibility for unemployment insurances where
the claimant voluntarily quit for personal or domestic reasons. Thirty-eight states have no provi-
sion of this type. See supra note 71.
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lence by itself is not good cause to leave employment, domestic vio-
lence may in some circumstances be so disabling as to necessitate a
quit.
As discussed previously, this final theory exacts a higher stand-
ard than the "compelling personal circumstances" theory, and seems
to require that a claimant be in imminent danger of disability, injury,
or death before the claimant is effectively "disabled.""1 ' In contrast,
the "compelling personal circumstances" theory has allowed for "good
cause" quits in less serious situations.'52 For this reason, the disability
theory is dangerous and should be used only when necessary.
Because no courts to date have held that domestic violence is, by
itself, work-related, this Comment's discussion will focus on the sec-
ond and third theories. Courts have applied existing statutory provi-
sions analogous to other states' "compelling personal interest" exemp-
tion to provide unemployment benefits to domestic violence victims.
For instance, in Rivers v. Stiles,15 3 the court applied a "personal
emergency" exception in the Arkansas unemployment insurance
statute, which would provide good cause to quit employment, to a
domestic violence situation and remanded for a determination of the
claimant's reasonable efforts to maintain employment."5 The claim-
ant in Rivers suffered threats of physical abuse, had been ejected from
her home, and sought shelter with others. 5 The claimant was no
longer able to get to work and also had to resolve emergency housingissues.56 The court found that this extreme domestic violence circum-
stance could constitute a "personal emergency" that barred disqualifi-
cation from unemployment insurance benefits.5 7
Similarly, in 1985 a Pennsylvania court found that a domestic
violence situation could be of such a "necessitous and compelling
nature" that a claimant could quit a job and remain eligible for unem-
ployment compensation benefits if the claimant could prove that
quitting the job was reasonable.5 8 The claimant quit her job and took
151. See Middleton v. Empl. Sec. Dept. No. 95-2-02078-7 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't
Office of Admin. Hearings, July 1, 1996), and discussion infra Part II.A.
152. See In re B.J., Docket No. 9-09554 (Wash. Employment Security Dep't, commis-
sioner's dec. 1982) (affirming an ALJ's determination that a claimant was eligible for benefits
under RCW 50.20.050(3) and had good cause to leave work when the claimant quit to prevent
the unwanted attentions of a supervisor).
153. 697 S.W.2d 938 (Ark. 1985).
154. Id. at 939. The court did not find, however, that domestic violence, by itself, was
good cause to leave employment.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Bacon v. Commonwealth, 491 A.2d 944, 945 (Pa. 1985). The court did not find that
domestic violence, by itself, was good cause to leave employment.
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her children to live with their father, her former husband, because she
was in fear for her life and for that of her children due to her current
husband's past conduct and alcohol consumption."5 9 The court
emphasized the burden that the unemployment insurance board
placed on the claimant to prove that she had no alternative but to quit
her job and move out of town: "Specifically, the Board alleges that
claimant could have sought a protection from abuse or moved into
another home in the area thereby allowing her to retain her job. The
Board would place the impossible burden of proving a negative on
claimant. '"160 Unfortunately, because the Board only imposed a bur-
den on the claimant and did not make any factual findings regarding
her choice, the court remanded for factual findings regarding the "rea-
sonableness of the claimant's choice concerning her emotional state at
the time and the personal problems with which she had to cope.' 161
Although there is no "compelling personal circumstances" provi-
sion in the Washington unemployment insurance statutes, personal
reasons have often been so work-related as to constitute good cause for
voluntary termination of employment and entitle the worker to unem-
ployment benefits in Washington.162  For example, Matison v. Hutt
involved individuals who elected to terminate employment rather than
lose union benefits. 63 The plaintiffs were entitled to health, welfare,
and pension benefits through their union, but a decertification election
terminated the union house relationship with the employer."
Although these benefits derived from voluntary membership in a
union and were not strictly work-related, Matison interpreted the
RCW 50.20.050 "good cause" requirement to encompass the loss of
union benefits.16
In Washington, during a claimant's first appeal 166 for denial of
benefits to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), 167 an
159. Id. at 944.
160. Id. at 946.
161. Id. at 946-47.
162. See Matison v. Hutt, 85 Wash. 2d 836, 539 P.2d 852 (1975); see also Davis v.
Employment Sec. Dep't, 108 Wash. 2d 272, 737 P.2d 1262 (1987) (holding that the "marital
status" exception to the rule that voluntarily quitting employment disqualifies claimant from
receiving unemployment compensation benefits does not prevent claimant whose meretricious
relationship causes a claimant to leave employment from being disqualified from receiving bene-
fits).
163. Matison, 85 Wash. 2d at 837, 539 P.2d at 853.
164. Id. at 839, 539 P.2d at 854.
165. Id. at 840, 539 P.2d at 854.
166. It is important to note here that the slim number of unemployment insurance eligibil-
ity cases based on domestic violence is indicative of the fact that unemployment insurance is
directed by administrative agencies. The claim has the possibility of going through at least four
different review levels before it ever comes before an appeals court and is published. The claim
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administrative law judge (ALJ) may often construe the RCW
50.20.050(4) "marital status" or "domestic responsibilities" exemption
to encompass domestic violence situations.168 However, none of the
initial OAH decisions made by ALJs are published and none of the
domestic violence decisions that have been affirmed by the Employ-
ment Security Department (ESD) have been published as final Com-
missioner decisions.169  Therefore, these decisions do not constitute
binding authority for future cases.
The third method by which courts could provide benefits to vic-
tims who leave work due to domestic violence situations is to find that
the domestic violence is of such a nature as to qualify as a disability
where disability is considered a legal exemption from the requirement
that voluntary quits be work-related. In Washington, although courts
have not held that domestic violence, by itself, is either good cause to
leave employment or is work-related, some Washington courts have
found that domestic violence does qualify, in some circumstances, as a
disability.' Similarly, an ALJ may also determine that a claimant's
is initially seen by an employment security claims officer who reviews and accepts or denies
benefits. If the claimant or employer contest this decision, the appeal is taken to an administra-
tive law judge (ALJ) or other independent administrative reviewing officer. See WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 192-04-060 (1999). If this decision is appealed by either the claimant, employee, or the
economic security department, then a reviewing officer of the economic security department
reviews the findings of the ALJ. See WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.464(4) (1998). Only if this
decision is appealed does the claim come before a district court judge. The decision is only
published at the appellate court level. Unfortunately, most published cases regarding domestic
violence across the country have held that domestic violence, in itself, is not "good cause" to quit
a job. See, e.g, Hall v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm., 697 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1997);
Rivers v. Stiles, 697 So. 2d 541 (Ark. 1997); Bacon v. Commonwealth, 491 A.2d 944 (Pa. 1985).
167. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-04-060 (1999).
168. For example, In re Khaki, No. 2-11521-V (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't Office of
Admin. Hearings 1992), applied section 50.20.050(3) of the Revised Code of Washington, which
includes the catch-all proviso that the ESD commissioner shall only consider work-related factors
in determining good cause for a quit "unless the commissioner determines that other related
circumstances would work an unreasonable hardship on the individual where he or she required
to continue the employment." The claimant was thus able to establish good cause for her
voluntary quit due to facts of prior physical abuse, continued threats and harassment.
169. Interview with ALJ Jody Keyes, Office of Administrative Hearings in Olympia,
Washington (Feb. 24, 1999). Generally, the Commissioner of ESD publishes various decisions
each year that highlight ESD's current interpretation of unemployment laws. These decisions
are intended to guide claimants, the Employment Security Department (ESD), and ALJs in mak-
ing eligibility determinations.
170. Middleton v. Empl. Sec. Dept., No. 95-2-02078-7 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't
Office of Admin. Hearings, July 1, 1996). The superior court remanded for determination of
whether domestic violence of such a type to be disabling. The Washington Office of Admini-
strative Hearings for the Employment Security Department held on August 16, 1996, that the
claimant had established good cause for her voluntary quit, due to extreme domestic violence
situation that effectively "disabled" claimant, as required by WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050
(1998).
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domestic violence situation was an "illness" as defined under RCW
50.20.050(2)(b).' 7
1
Without legislation, women who qualify for unemployment
compensation receive benefits after leaving work due to domestic vio-
lence only if they demonstrate that they tried all other methods prior
to a quit,172 or if the domestic violence was so severe as to constitute a
disability 173 or a compelling personal circumstance in some states.
Without legislation, the decision of whether a woman in a domestic
violence situation, who left work to protect herself and her children,
had good cause is often in the hands of the initial claims decision
maker.
Because domestic violence is not commonly perceived as a
legitimate reason to leave work, an initial rejection would likely cause
most claimants to abandon the effort without an appeal.1 7 4 Although
domestic violence frequently occurs at work and often causes victims
to leave work, domestic violence-related unemployment compensation
cases are difficult to find both on the judicial and administrative lev-
els.1 75 The consensus among many domestic violence advocates is that
domestic violence victims rarely appeal the initial rejection. This is
true even if the claimant could otherwise make a good argument
before an administrative law judge or in court.1 76 If domestic violence
171. WASH. REV. CODE §50.20.050(2) (1998) provides: "An individual shall not be con-
sidered to have left work voluntarily without good cause" when:
(b) The separation was because of the illness or disability of the claimant or the death,
illness, or disability of a member of the claimant's immediate family if the claim-
ant took all reasonable precautions, in accordance with any regulations that the
commissioner may prescribe, to protect his or her employment status by having
promptly notified the employer of the reason for the absence and by having
promptly requested reemployment when again able to assume employment:
PROVIDED, That these precautions need not have been taken when they would
have been a futile act ....
172. Middleton, No. 95-2-02078-7 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't Office of Admin. Hear-
ings, July 1, 1996).
173. Id.
174. Telephone interview with Pam Crone, attorney, Unemployment Law Project, in Seat-
tle, Washington (June 10, 1998); telephone interview with Maurice Emsellen, attorney, National
Unemployment Law Project, in New York, N.Y. (June 9, 1998); letter from Jon Bloom, Execu-
tive Director, Workers Defense League, New York, New York, to author (Mar. 1, 2000). Pam
Crone hypothesized the low number of appeals was probably due in part to the added distress of
having to appeal, the claimant being treated as if she had done something wrong, and the possi-
bility of the claimant exposing herself to visibility to her abuser through repeated court appear-
ances. Jon Bloom emphasized that many eligible claimants do not receive unemployment
insurance because (a) they are discouraged by initial denials and (b) short deadlines to appeal
adverse decisions (usually twenty to thirty days).
175. See N.Y. Report, supra note 126, at 3; Bureau of Labor Statistics, in Congressional
Findings of H.R. 851, supra note 130; note 166, supra; and text infra Part III.
176. Telephone interview with Pam Crone, attorney, Unemployment Law Project, in Seat-
tle, Washington, (June 10, 1998); telephone interview with Sharon Case, lobbyist, Washington
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claimants rarely appeal the initial rejection, it probably means that the
numbers of those who would otherwise qualify, if not frustrated by
initial rejection, is higher than the numbers of appeals. Legislation
would help to remedy the dilemma of those who may be eligible but
do not appeal an initial rejection.
C. Providing Benefits to Domestic Violence Victims
Through Agency Policy
Another way that unemployment insurance benefits are provided
to domestic violence claimants is by agency policy. This may happen
in two ways. First, the administrative agency that implements the
unemployment compensation program may be directed to address the
issue of domestic violence, problems relating to contingent workers, or
other unemployment compensation issues by the state legislature. In
this scenario, the agency makes recommendations to the legislature
and creates policy to implement these recommendations. Second, the
administrative agency independently decides to provide benefits to
claimants fleeing domestic violence. In both of these situations, the
general public has little or no voice in determining whether the agency
implements a policy in favor of domestic violence survivors. Agency
policy is not rule-making and requires no opportunity for comment.
Unless the legislature directs the agency that implements unemploy-
ment compensation to adopt a specific rule regarding domestic vio-
lence, the public may not even be aware of the agency policy.
In May 1993 the Minnesota legislature directed the Commis-
sioner of Jobs and Training to develop a policy to address the issue of
employees forced to leave employment due to domestic violence.'77
The Department of Economic Security (DES), created a policy
expanding the serious illness provision of the unemployment insur-
ance laws, which was considered good cause to voluntarily leave
employment, to include domestic violence.'78 Although this policy
created a small avenue of opportunity for domestic violence victims,
the policy made it clear to all DES employees that a domestic violence
claimant was required to make "reasonable efforts" to retain employ-
State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Olympia, Washington (Sept. 20, 1998); letter from
Jon Bloom, Executive Director, Workers Defense League, New York, New York, to author
(Mar. 1, 2000).
177. Minn. H.B. 78 Leg. SF 236 (1993).
178. Minnesota internal UI Policy #94-03 (Jan. 27, 1994) (on file with the Seattle Univer-
sity Law Review). See also telephone conversation with Shawn Frempstead, Attorney, Legal Ser-
vices Advocacy Project, St. Paul, Minn (June 9, 1998).
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ment prior to leaving employment.179 This policy also creates the risk
that initial claims will be denied by those who make initial claims deci-
sions because they do not believe the seriousness of the particular
situation or believe the claimant did not make reasonable efforts to
keep her job before leaving.
An agency policy providing benefits to victims of domestic vio-
lence is similar to legislation and is better than leaving the decision in
the hands of the ultimate fact-finder to locate a provision in existing
law that might fit the particular situation. Agency policy is applied by
agency officials, administrative law judges, and court judges alike,
unless it conflicts with existing law. For instance, an agency policy to
provide unemployment compensation benefits to victims of domestic
violence would conflict with existing law if providing such benefits to
victims of domestic violence was specifically prohibited."' However,
policy decisions that do not conflict with statutory language, but
require the claimant to prove that she made reasonable efforts to retain
employment before leaving employment, expose the claimant to the
mercy of the initial claims examiner. States or domestic violence
advocates who consider this approach should be aware of this possible
pitfall.
IV. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO PROVIDE
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS
The third option used by states that recognize the connection
between domestic violence and work is to provide unemployment
compensation to victims of domestic violence who leave work to
obtain safety by adding domestic violence as a work-related good
cause reason to leave employment to the state unemployment compen-
sation regulations or statutes. This option is desirable because legisla-
tion provides many benefits that reinterpretation and agency policy do
not. First, legislation regarding domestic violence is publicized.
Domestic violence advocates speculate that one reason why the num-
ber of domestic violence-related unemployment insurance claims is so
low is because of a lack of knowledge by domestic violence survivors
about the state of the law and the availability of benefits.181 A public
legislative effort would help to assure that legitimate claimants are not
179. Minnesota internal UI Policy #94-03 (Jan. 27, 1994). The memo is unclear regarding
what would be considered "reasonable efforts."
180. Currently, no state statutes provide that claimants who leave work due to domestic
violence are, per se, ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits.
181. See Maine Coalition Against Domestic Violence Memo (on file with the Seattle
University Law Review).
2o000]
Seattle University Law Review
discouraged by initial rejections of their claims for unemployment
benefits.
Second, legislation helps shape the awareness of agency officials.
Even if a compelling personal circumstance exemption exists in unem-
ployment compensation laws, an initial agency decisionmaker may
believe that domestic violence is not a compelling personal circum-
stance. Legislation sends a strong message to the entire agency that
domestic violence that affects a worker's safety is a legitimate reason to
leave work.
Finally, legislation settles many issues regarding the level of
proof that a claimant is required to present to prove domestic violence,
the standard of review, or the necessity of a claimant to have first
made reasonable efforts to preserve employment. This prevents
domestic violence cases from being decided in a haphazard manner,
dependent upon the discretion of a judge or a decision by an adminis-
trative official that the failure of a claimant to take further legal action
against an abuser before leaving work indicates a lack of danger.
A. An Era of Change: Legislative Leaders-1 987 Through 1998
1. Maine
In 1987 Maine was the first state to pass legislation providing
unemployment compensation benefits to victims of domestic violence
who leave work to obtain safety."8 2 The Maine statute provides that a
claimant who voluntarily leaves work may not be disqualified from
unemployment compensation benefits where the leaving was "neces-
sary to protect the claimant from domestic violence and the claimant
made all reasonable efforts to preserve employment."1"3 This legisla-
tion, by defining domestic abuse, settles the problem of the initial
claims taker making a unilateral decision and determining that the
domestic violence was not severe enough to leave employment.
Domestic abuse in Maine is defined in section 1043 of Maine's unem-
ployment compensation statute, and includes attempting to cause or
causing bodily injury; attempting to place or placing another in fear of
182. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. § 1193-1A(4) (West 1999) provides in part:
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits.. For the week in which the claimant
left regular employment voluntarily without good cause attributable to that employ-
ment. The disqualification continues until the claimant has earned 4 times the claim-
ant's weekly benefit amount in employment by an employer. A claimant may not be
disqualified under this paragraph if... (4) The leaving was necessary to protect the
claimant from domestic abuse and the claimant made all reasonable efforts to preserve
the employment.
183. Id.
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bodily injury; compelling a person by force, threat or intimidation to
engage in conduct which the person has a right to abstain from;
repeatedly intimidating or harassing a person with the intention of
causing fear or intimidation; and knowingly restricting the movements
of a person without consent.184
This definition allows for many possible situations involving
domestic violence. This definition is not limited to instances where
the claimant's life was threatened. In addition, although the claimant
in Maine bears the burden of proving domestic violence, there is no
evidentiary requirement in the statute. Chris Hasted, staff attorney
with the Maine Equal Justice Project, who assisted in lobbying for the
legislation, emphasizes that, without an evidentiary requirement, the
burden of proof is quite simple.18 Usually a statement from the
claimant is enough.'86
Unfortunately, despite the ease of this process, the number of
actual cases filed with Maine's Bureau of Employment Security since
the enactment of the statute in 1987 has been negligible. According to
Gall Thayer of the Bureau of Employment Security, the actual num-
ber is too small to calculate using the Bureau's traditional methods of
calculation. 87  This is good news for employers who are charged
unemployment insurance tax by percentage of use, but is distressing
news for domestic violence advocates who know the problem of
domestic violence is larger than the numbers indicate. It is quite pos-
sible that the existence of the Maine legislation is not very well known
to the public generally, and to domestic violence victims specifically.
2. New Hampshire
New Hampshire passed H.B. 579 in June 1998.188 The legisla-
tion was the result of legislative study on the needs of the contingent
184. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. § 1043 (West 1999).
185. Telephone interview with Chris Hastetd, staff attorney and lobbyist, Main Equal Jus-
tice Project, Augusta, Maine (July 14, 1998); telephone interview with Bruce Neas, Attorney,
Washington Columbia Legal Services in Olympia, Wash. (July 14, 1998).
186. Id.
187. Telephone interview with Gail Thayer, Unemployment Insurance officer, Maine
Bureau of Employment Security, Augusta, Maine (July 14, 1998).
188. Codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 82-A:32I(a)(3) (1998). Section 82-A:32 I pro-
vides in pertinent part:
Until the individual has earned in each of 5 weeks wages in employment as defined in
§ RSA 282-A:9... (a) The individual left work voluntarily without good cause in
accordance with rules of the commissioner. This section shall not apply and benefits
shall be paid without regard thereto where...
(3) The leaving of employment was necessary to protect the individual from
domestic abuse, as defined in § RSA 173-B:1 and in accordance with rules
2000]
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 23:797
workforce in New Hampshire.189 The study and legislation were pro-
posed by New Hampshire Legal Assistance attorneys.19 The study
concluded that domestic violence was a serious problem for New
Hampshire's labor force as a whole, and for contingent workers in
particular. The study proposed that an exemption to the voluntary
quit disqualification be provided to victims of domestic violence.
Jonathan Baird, of New Hampshire Legal Assistance, emphasized that
a primary reason the legislation passed was that the statistics from
Maine regarding the number of claims filed under similar legislation
was so low.191
The provisions of H.B. 579 were modeled after Maine's law and
look quite similar.192 The legislation provides that a person who leaves
a job in order to protect himself or herself from domestic abuse will
not be denied unemployment compensation if the leaving was neces-
sary to protect the individual from domestic abuse.' 93 However, the
New Hampshire legislation requires that the claimant make all reason-
able efforts to preserve the employment and either relocate to escape
the abuse or be unable to return to work due to changed work circum-
stances.194 The legislation also requires that a claimant who is unable
to return to work due to changed circumstances must make all efforts
to preserve the employer-employee relationship or possibility of
adopted by the commissioner, and the individual made all reasonable efforts
to preserve the employment, and in addition:
(A) The individual relocated to escape the abuse; or
(B) The individual, due to changed circumstances, is able to return to the
individual's employment, but the employer is unable to return the
individual to the individual's job, or to comparable work, due solely to:
(i) A reduction in work force; or
(ii) Other economic conditions, and the individual did all things that
a reasonably prudent person would have done to continue the
employer-employee relationship or the possibility of reemploy-
ment during the period the individual was unable to work due to
the domestic abuse.
189. Unemployment compensation scholars will be interested to note that this legislative
survey resulted not only in the voluntary quit for domestic abuse exemption, but also increased
benefit levels, provided an alternative base period for calculating unemployment insurance bene-
fits, and changed the "available" requirement for workers with permanent mental or physical
disabilities. See also Memorandum from New Hampshire Assistance Legal to Employment Law
Task Force (June 11, 1998) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
190. Id. (listing the steps in the legislative effort to provide benefits to victims of domestic
violence).
191. Telephone interview with Jonathan Baird, staff attorney, New Hampshire Coalition
Against Domestic Violence in Claremont, N.H. (July 14, 1998).
192. Id.
193. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 82-A:32I (1998).
194. Id.
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employment during the time the claimant is unable to work due to
domestic violence. 195
These requirements are more strict than Maine's legislative
requirements. However, the level of proof required by the New
Hampshire legislature is a low standard similar to Maine's. The
claimant may prove that domestic violence existed through any evi-
dence at all, including the following: a police report, domestic vio-
lence counselor affidavit, or any third party documentation, or even a
claimant's statement. 196
3. California
In August 1998 California followed New Hampshire's example
and passed S.B. 165.197 The legislation provides that leaving work to
protect oneself or one's children from domestic violence is a good
cause reason for eligibility for unemployment compensation. 19 Addi-
tionally, the statute explicitly recognizes the effect domestic violence
has on employment. 9 9 Because domestic violence is considered nei-
ther the fault of the employee nor the fault of the employer, the legis-
lation is financed through noncharging unemployment insurance
benefits."' 0
This legislation continues the progressive efforts of California to
provide unemployment insurance benefits in limited nonwork-related
situations."' The legislation provides up to $230 per week for twenty-
195. Id.
196. Telephone interview with Jonathan Baird, supra note 191.
197. Codified at CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West 1999); see also Legal Aid Society
of San Francisco, Unemployment Law Center press release (Aug. 31, 1998). Section 1256 states,
in pertinent part, "[a]n individual may be deemed to have left his or her most recent work with
good cause if he or she leaves employment to protect his or her children, or himself or herself,
from domestic violence abuse." Section 1 of 1998 Cal. Stat. 411, also provides:
The Legislature finds and declares that: The Employment Development Depart-
ment, through its regulatory authority, currently provides unemployment insurance
benefits to victims of domestic violence who left employment with good cause.
Because certain other good cause conditions are specified by statute, it is necessary to
specify by statute that an otherwise eligible victim of domestic violence can receive
unemployment insurance benefits if found to have left with good cause to highlight
the existence of this crime and its effect on employment, and in addition, to exempt
employers' reserve accounts from increased charges because the victim left employ-
ment through no fault of the employer.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Existing California unemployment legislation provides benefits to those who leave
work to accompany a spouse who moves to another city to take other employment. See, e.g.,
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West 1999) which provides: "An individual may be deemed
to have left his or her most recent work with good cause if he or she leaves employment to
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six weeks, depending upon the claimant's earnings in a base period. °2
The level of proof required by claimants is not specified in the legisla-
tion and has not yet been determined by court decision.0 3
B. National Attempts at Legislation-I 996
In 1996 H.R. 3837, The Battered Women's Employment Act,
part of the Violence Against Women Act, was proposed. 24 This bill
recognized the connection between domestic violence and unemploy-
ment and the costs of domestic violence in the workplace. H.R. 3837
attempted to amend section 3304(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 to include domestic violence. H.R. 3837 also provided that the
victim's need to recover from domestic violence or an employer's
denial of temporary leave to deal with domestic violence would be
good cause to leave employment, "where the employee believes that
termination of employment is necessary for the future safety of the
employee or employee's family. '20 ' The act further specified that if a
state required a claimant to make all reasonable efforts to maintain
employment, such reasonable efforts would include seeking protection
or assistance from police, legal or social workers, pursuing legal pro-
tection, or participating in psychological, social or religious counsel-
ing. 206
Although H.R. 3837 did not pass, it created quite a stir in the
legal services and domestic violence advocacy community. 27 Through
the proposal of this bill, the federal government recognized the impact
domestic violence had on the workplace. The bill was followed in
1998 by H.R. 851, the Battered Women's Employment Protection
Act, which was part of VAWA 11.2 °" The language was essentially the
same as H.R. 3837 and included additional congressional findings
regarding domestic violence in the workplace. 209 By defining the situa-
tions that would be reasonable efforts and identifying how domestic
accompany his or her spouse to a place from which it is impractical to commute to the employ-
ment. For purposes of this section "spouse" includes a person to whom marriage is imminent."
202. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West 1999).
203. Id.
204. H.R. 3837, 104th Cong. (1996).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. In fact, it was in part due to the statistical findings and tidal wave of support behind
VAWA that helped forward the impetus between the recently passed California and Maine stat-
utes that provided unemployment insurance to domestic violence victims. Telephone interview
with Robin Runge, staff attorney, San Francisco Legal Assistance, San Francisco, California
(July 24, 1998).
208. H.R. 851,105th Cong. (1997).
209. Id.
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violence could be proven, both of these acts anticipated the difficulties
that domestic violence survivors encounter when attempting to prove
domestic violence and proving reasonable efforts to maintain employ-
ment.210
C. National Attempts at Legislation-i 998
After New Hampshire and California's effective legislative
efforts, the 1998-1999 legislative session experienced a small flurry of
similarly successful efforts to provide unemployment insurance to vic-
tims of domestic violence. Colorado,211 Connecticut,212 New Jersey,1 3
210. Id.
211. COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-73-108(4) (West Supp. 1999) provides that
An individual separated from a job shall be given full award of benefits if any of the
following reasons and pertinent conditions related thereto are determined by the divi-
sion to have existed....
(j) Being physically or mentally unable to perform the work... In cases where
an individual quits because of domestic abuse, any award of benefits will be
made in accordance with paragraph (r) of this subsection (4)...
(r)(I) quitting a job because of domestic abuse may be reason for a deter-
mination of a full award only if:
(A) The division has been provided a copy of a police report, crimi-
nal charges, restraining order, medical records, or any other
corroborative evidence documenting the domestic abuse;
(B) The worker provides written substantiation that the worker is
receiving assistance or counseling from a recognized counseling
entity for domestic abuse; and
(C) The division certifies and notifies the employer and the hearing
officer that no prior award under the provisions of the paragraph
(r) has been made to he worker within the preceding three years.
(II) If the worker does not meet the provisions of subparagraph (1) of
this paragraph (r), the worker shall be held to have voluntarily
terminated employment for the purposes of determining benefits...
(III) Any benefits awarded to the claimant under the provisions of this
paragraph (r) normally chargeable to the employer shall be charged
to the fund.
This legislation was adopted in 1999.
212. 1999 Conn. Acts 99-123 (Reg. Sess.) (to be codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-
236(a(2)(A)). "Good cause" includes leaving "to protect the individual or a child domiciled with
the individual from becoming or remaining a victim of domestic violence" provided that the
individual has made reasonable efforts to preserve the employment. The employer's account
shall not be charged.
213. N.J. REv. STAT. 43:21-5 (2000) provides that
An individual shall be disqualified from benefits... (j) Notwithstanding any other
provisions of this chapter, no otherwise eligible individual shall be denied benefits
because the individual left work or was discharged due to circumstances resulting
from the individual being a victim of domestic violence as defined in section 3 of
P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19). No employer's account shall be charged for the pay-
ment of benefits to an individual who left work due to circumstances resulting from
the individual being a victim of domestic violence.
This legislation was signed into law on January 19, 2000.
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New York,214 North Carolina,215 Wisconsin,216 and Wyoming 217 passed
legislation either similar to or identical to existing legislation in the
first three states. Oregon's Employment Security Department adopt-
ed a new agency regulation that provides benefits to victims of domes-
tic violence. 21" As discussed throughout this Comment, resistance to
this type of legislation has encompassed issues about standing, levels
of proof, and whether the employer should be charged for benefits
provided.219 These statutes, and Iowa's regulation, illustrate an evolv-
ing sophistication and efforts to deal with these perceived problems.
For instance, North Carolina limits benefits to individuals who
have experienced domestic violence committed upon the claimant by a
214. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593-1(a) (McKinney 1998) provides in part: "A voluntary
separation may also be deemed for good cause if it occurred as a consequence of circumstances
directly resulting from the claimant being a victim of domestic violence." This legislation was
adopted in 1999.
215. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(10) (1998) provides that
For the purposes of this Chapter, any claimant's leaving work, or discharge, if the
claimant has been adjudged an aggrieved party as set forth by Chapter 50B of the
General Statutes as the result of domestic violence committed upon the claimant or
upon a minor child with or in the custody of the claimant by a person who has or has
had a familial relationship with the claimant or minor child, shall constitute good
cause for leaving work. Benefits paid on the basis of this section shall be noncharged.
This legislation was made effective July 1, 1998.
216. Chapter 15, 1999 Wis. Laws 255. The statute allows a domestic violence victim to
voluntarily terminate her work and receive unemployment benefits without requalifying if she:
(I) terminates work because of domestic abuse, concerns about her personal safety
or harassment, or concerns about the personal safety or harassment of her
family or household members;
(II) has obtained a temporary or permanent restraining order; AND
(III) demonstrates to the department that the restraining order has been or is
reasonably likely to be violated.
Benefits will not be charged to the employer. This legislation was passed on December 16,
1999.
217. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-311 (Michie 1999) provides in part:
(a) An individual shall be disqualified from benefit entitlement beginning with the
effective date of an otherwise valid claim... until he has been employed in an
employee-employer relationship for a period of at least twelve (12) weeks whether
or not consecutive, and has earned at least twelve (12) times the weekly benefit
amount of his current claim for services after that date, if the department finds
that he: (i) Left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause attributable
directly to his employment, except... (C) If forced to leave the most recent work
as a result of being a victim of documented domestic violence.
This legislation was enacted during the 1999 Regular Session.
218. OR. ADMIN. R. 471-030-0038 (1999). Amendment to the rule clarifies that a domes-
tic violence victim who is endangered at a current workplace and who pursues reasonable alter-
natives prior to voluntarily leaving work may be considered voluntarily leaving work with good
cause. Reasonable alternatives may include actions such as seeking a restraining order, relocating
to a secure area, and seeking reasonable accommodations from the employer such as a transfer
within the company.
219. See discussion, infra, Part V.B.
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person who has or has had a familial relationship with the claimant.
Both Colorado's 22' and New Jersey S222 statutes outline the types of
proof a claimant may provide to show that domestic violence has
occurred, Wyoming requires that the domestic violence be "docu-
mented,, 23 and North Carolina's statute defines domestic violence
with reference to another statutory provision. 24 Colorado's statute
provides that the benefits shall be noncharging to the employer and
shall come from the general unemployment insurance fund.225
These statutes were passed through various efforts; some with
the assistance of domestic violence advocates. New Jersey's Domestic
Violence Coalition had a strong role in passing its legislation, and the
North Carolina Justice Project assisted in the formation and passage of
legislation in that state.226 Similarly, the Domestic Violence and
220. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(lf) (1998).
221. See COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-73-108(4)(r)(I) (West Supp. 1999). The statute
provides that
Quitting a job because of domestic abuse may be reason for a determination for a full
award only if:
(A) The division has been provided a copy of a police report, criminal charges,
restraining order, medical records, or any other corroborative evidence
documenting the domestic abuse;
(B) The worker provides written substantiation that the worker is receiving
assistance or counseling from a recognized counseling entity for domestic
abuse; and
(C) The division certifies and notifies the employer and the hearing officer that
no prior award under the provisions of this paragraph (r) has been made to
the worker within the preceding three years.
222. See N.J. REV. STAT. 43:21-5(j) (2000), providing that
For the purposes of this subsection (j), the individual shall be treated as being a victim
of domestic violence if the individual provides one or more of the following: (1) A
restraining order or other documentation of equitable relief issued by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction; (2) A police record documenting the domestic violence; (3) Docu-
mentation that the perpetrator of the domestic violence has been convicted of one or
more of the offenses enumerated in section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19); (4)
Medical documentation of the domestic violence; (5) Certification from a certified
Domestic Violence Specialist or the director of a designated domestic violence agency
that the individual is a victim of domestic violence; or (6) Other documentation or
certification of the domestic violence provided by a social worker, member of the
clergy, shelter worker or other professional who has assisted the individual in dealing
with the domestic violence.
223. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-311(a)(i)(C) (Michie 1999).
224. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(10 (1998).
225. COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-73-108(4)(r)(III) (West Supp. 1999). "Any benefits
awarded to the claimant under the provisions of this paragraph (r) normally chargeable to the
employer shall be charged to the fund." See also N.J. REV. STAT. 43:21-5(j) (2000).
226. Telephone interview with Maurice Emsellen, attorney, National Employment Law
Project (Feb. 15, 2000) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review). As a side note, the
North Carolina legislation passed unanimously as part of general unemployment legislation.
Letter from Dan Gerlach, North Carolina Budget and Tax Center, to author (Feb. 12, 2000) (on
file with the Seattle University Law Review).
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 23:797
Unemployment Project had a strong role in undertaking state studies
on the impact of domestic violence in the workplace and helping to
form resulting unemployment insurance laws.227 In Oregon, legisla-
tion failed, so the agency provided benefits under its general rule-
making power.2" However, in New York, the statutory provisions
were passed by the legislature without much assistance from the
domestic violence advocacy communities. 229 This may mean that this
type of legislation is becoming more acceptable to the legislative and
business community.
Unfortunately, since these additional statutes have only recently
been passed, there are no current cases that utilize the legislation.
Furthermore, Maurice Emsellen of the National Employment Law
Project in New York reports that the older statutes in Maine, New
Hampshire, and California still have not generated many claims.
This may be because there are no provisions in any of the statutes that
provide for training of unemployment claims processors to recognize
domestic violence victims or education of claimants regarding possible
eligibility status. Domestic violence victims are not filing for benefits
because they do not realize they are eligible. 231 There is still much that
domestic violence advocates in these states can do to educate claimants
and lawyers.232
227. Telephone interview with Robin Runge, Staff Attorney, Legal Aid Society of San
Francisco (July 14, 1998).
228. Telephone interview with Maurice Emsellen, attorney, National Employment Law
Project (Feb. 15, 2000).
229. Letter from Chuck Sheketoff, Oregon Center for Public Policy, in Silverton, Oregon,
to author (Feb. 12, 2000) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
230. Telephone interview with Maurice Emsellen, attorney, National Employment Law
Project (Feb. 15, 2000).
231. Id.; Telephone interview with Pam Crone, University of Washington Legal Aid
Clinic, Unemployment Insurance (Feb. 15, 2000).
232. For example, domestic violence advocates in states which have existing legislation still
assert that there is little coordination between the state employment security departments which
process claims and claimant advocates. Specifically, Robin Runge of the Legal Aid Society of
San Francisco states that their office has had a difficult time speaking with agency representatives
to set up training on the new legislation, while Maurice Emsellen of the National Employment
Law Project has reported that caseworkers are not trained to process domestic violence claims
and little outreach has yet been done. Robin Runge, Staff Attorney, Legal Aid Society of San
Francisco, letter to author (July 14, 1998); letter from Maurice Emsellen, attorney, National
Employment Law Project, to author (Feb. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle University Law
Review). It must be noted here that Delaware has attempted, and failed, to pass legislation that
would provide unemployment insurance to victims of domestic violence. H.B. 252, 140th Gen.
Assembl. (Del. 1999). This legislation would provide that an individual who leaves employment
due to circumstances directly resulting from domestic violence shall not be disqualified from the
receipt of unemployment insurance if leaving work resulted from:
(i) fear of domestic violence en route to or at work;
(ii) relocation to another geographic area to avoid domestic violence;
(iii)recovery from traumatic stress due to domestic violence;
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V. THE CASE FOR LEGISLATION IN WASHINGTON
As this Comment previously notes, domestic violence is increas-
ingly becoming a work-related problem. Domestic violence may occur
at home or at a victim's place of employment. As women make up an
increasingly larger proportion of the workforce, domestic violence fol-
lows them to work. The workplace is the easiest way for an abuser to
again locate, harass, intimidate, attack, or even kill his or her victim.
Washington is not exempt from this phenomenon. Washington's
employers should not ignore the fact that domestic violence takes the
lives of employees who are trying to keep their jobs. The benefits of
providing an additional option to employees who are forced to choose
between their lives and their jobs through unemployment compensa-
tion are multifold.
A. The Benefits of Providing Unemployment Insurance to DV Victims
The benefits of providing unemployment insurance to victims of
domestic violence who leave employment to seek safety for themselves
and their children fall into three primary categories. First, by provid-
ing unemployment insurance benefits to victims of domestic violence,
the purpose and intent of unemployment insurance-to provide finan-
cial assistance to those who are unemployed through no fault of their
own-is fulfilled. Domestic violence is not the fault of the victim, and
often requires that a victim leave employment to protect herself and
her children from further abuse.
The second category includes financial benefits. Because domes-
tic violence often interferes with worker safety, productivity, and
morale, providing victims with an opportunity to seek safety while
retaining a measure of financial independence saves employers' money
lost due to domestic violence situations occurring at work. Because
the benefits received through unemployment insurance are expressed
as a percentage of past earnings, they are also often higher than welfare
or TANF (Temporary Aid to Needy Families) flat payments,233
thereby providing more financial security for a claimant during a diffi-
cult and dangerous period. Additionally, as TANF has a five year
(iv)any other circumstance in which the domestic violence victim feels it is impera-
tive to leave work to protect oneself or one's family.
The employer's account would not be charged for receipt of benefits under this legislation.
For more information on advocacy efforts, domestic violence advocates may contact Jackie
Payne, Policy Attorney, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, at (202) 544-4470 or
jpayne@nowldefdc.org, or sign up for regular information on legislative efforts through the
National Employment Law Project at nelp-uiadvocates@egroups.com.
233. See WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.120(1) (1998); interview with Pam Crone, supra note
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lifetime limit in Washington for total benefits,234 providing unemploy-
ment compensation benefits to a domestic violence victim who quali-
fies for unemployment insurance will assure that the individual's
TANF account will not accrue months against her total benefits.
TANF could be used at another time of financial need when the indi-
vidual is ineligible for unemployment insurance.
Finally, as the structure of the work force and economy has
changed, providing unemployment insurance benefits to victims of
domestic violence is one step toward reforming an unemployment
compensation scheme that inaccurately reflects the nation's economic
structure. As women make up a greater proportion of the workforce,
and as domestic violence increasingly affects the workplace, unem-
ployment insurance programs need to be sensitive to the particular
needs of the employees who put their lives at risk to keep their jobs.
This Comment does not argue that we tie the hands of Washing-
ton's Employment Security Department (ESD) to determine whether
or not a domestic violence claim is a valid, substantiated claim. Under
a statute providing that domestic violence is good cause to leave
employment, ESD could ask for proof of domestic violence, as it may
ask for proof of other good cause reasons to leave employment. What
this Comment proposes is that we give ESD and claimants suffering
domestic abuse another option. As the legislation is currently written,
there is no choice but to deny initial benefits to a claimant who would
otherwise be eligible for unemployment insurance except for the fact
that the claimant's reason for leaving work is life-threatening domestic
abuse. A subsequent administrative or court decision may rule other-
wise for the claimant, under a different interpretation of the statutes,
but many claimants do not appeal.
B. Why Has Washington Not Instituted Unemployment
Insurance for DV Victims?
Employers are concerned with the costs associated with proposed
additional unemployment insurance benefits. The unemployment
compensation system in Washington works at a cost to the employer.
Every employer who has qualified employees pays a base rate of tax
that is entered into an unemployment compensation fund.23 The
more often employees utilize the unemployment compensation bene-
fits, the more the employer pays in taxes from the base rate.236 How-
234. See WASH. REV. CODE § 74.08A.010(1) (1998).
235. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 50.16 (1998); WASH. REV. CODE § 50.24.010
(1998).
236. WASH. REV. CODE § 56.29.025 (1998).
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ever, where awarded benefits are not due to the employer's action, the
employer can petition for relief of benefits and the tax of the individ-
ual employer does not increase.237 In circumstances where benefits
have been awarded to victims of domestic violence, the employers
could petition for relief from charges to their account and the cost
would come from the unemployment general fund.238
Additionally, the cost statistics from states which currently have
similar legislation or are considering similar legislation are quite low.
For example, in Maine, which has had similar legislation for over ten
years, in 1997, only six cases at the administrative hearing level related
to domestic violence.239 Minnesota, which has a Division of Economic
Security policy that provides benefits to victims of domestic violence
under a statutory "serious illness" provision, has not had any cases
reach the hearing level between 1994 and 1997.240 Additionally, in
1998 North Carolina commissioned a study of domestic violence and
unemployment insurance. 241 This survey estimated that the total
annual cost of providing unemployment benefits to qualifying victims
of domestic violence would be approximately $300,000.242
An informal survey of Washington ALJs who hear initial unem-
ployment compensation appeals indicates that each ALJ has approxi-
mately two cases per year on his or her docket.243 Because there are
twenty-eight ALJs statewide who preside over unemployment com-
pensation appeals, this would indicate that there are approximately
fifty-six cases per year that make it to the first administrative appeals
level. Finally, a fiscal note attached to S.B. 5136, proposed legislation
in Washington that would provide domestic violence as good cause to
leave employment, estimates that one hundred claimants per year will
obtain benefits through the new domestic violence provisions.244
237. WASH. REV. CODE§ 50.29.020 (1998).
238. Id.
239. Telephone interview with Alan Toubman, Unemployment Insurance Hearing Offi-
cer, Maine Bureau of Employment Security, Augusta, Maine (July 27, 1998).
240. Telephone interview with Shawn Frempsted, attorney, Legal Services Advocacy Pro-
ject, St. Paul, Minn. (June 9, 1998).
241. Domestic Violence and Unemployment Insurance in North Carolina, Terry Sanford
Institute of Public Policy at Duke University, May 1998 (unpublished paper).
242. Id. This estimate assumes that 20 percent of domestic violence victims in North
Carolina lose their job annually, and that 10 percent of this group would apply for and receive
benefits. The North Carolina legislature expects the current statute which provides unemploy-
ment insurance to victims of domestic violence, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14, to have little financial
impact. Letter from Dan Gelach, North Carolina Budget and Tax Center, to author (Feb. 16,
2000).
243. This survey was conducted by the author during an externship with the Washington
Office of Administrative Hearings, January 1999 through May 1999.
244. S.B. 5136, Fiscal Note, 55th Leg., 2d Sess. (Wash. 1999).
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Because an average of approximately 91,000 individuals receive
unemployment benefits per month 24 and approximately 22,500 new
claims are filed each month 246 in Washington, one hundred claimants
is a drop in the bucket of overall unemployment insurance costs.
A second concern is what sort of evidence a claimant must pro-
vide to show domestic violence existed. Some employers might be
worried that a claimant can simply quit work because she does not like
her boyfriend and wants to move back home. In Maine, New Hamp-
shire, and California, the three states that have legislation, evidence
comes from various sources. For example, in Maine, as there is no
evidentiary requirement in the statute, an administrative official con-
siders evidence of a protection order, police reports, or corroborating
testimony from an employer.247 The burden of proving domestic vio-
lence is on the claimant.248 Similarly, the burden of proving good
cause for a voluntary quit in Washington is on the claimant. 249 Addi-
tionally, S.B. 5136 specifically refers to RCW 9A.46.110, which
defines domestic violence. 20 A claimant cannot simply claim that he
or she left work due to a domestic violence situation without present-
ing proof sufficient to convince an ALJ that a domestic violence situa-
tion actually existed.
Additionally, employers might argue that the current unem-
ployment scheme provides benefits to victims whose domestic vio-
lence situation is extremely "disabling" and that the domestic violence
victim has no alternative but to flee work to obtain safety. However,
without specific legislation, the provision of benefits to domestic vio-
lence survivors depends upon how the presiding ALJ chooses to inter-
pret current regulations. On the very same fact pattern one ALJ may
choose to fird that a claimant in a domestic violence situation had
"domestic responsibilities" 21' necessitating a quit and provide benefits
after a ten-week waiting period, while another ALJ may find that the
245. Washington State Employment Security Department, Unemployment Insurance At-A-
Glance: New Claims (visited Feb. 12, 2000) <http://www.wa.gov/esd/ui/uiat-a-glance/
newclaiml.htm>.
246. Washington State Employment Security Department, Unemployment Insurance At-A-
Glance: Beneficiaries (visited Feb. 12, 2000) <http://www.wa.gov/esd/ui/uiat-a-glance/
bene.htm>.
247. Telephone interview with Chris Hastetd, staff attorney and lobbyist, Maine Equal
Justice Project, Augusta, Maine (July 14, 1998).
248. Id.
249. See Boeing v. Comm. of Empl. Sec. Dep't, 39 Wash. 2d 356, 365, 235 P.2d 303, 308
(1951) (holding that the burden of proof to establish a claimant's rights to benefits under the
unemployment security act rests upon the claimant).
250. S.B. 5136, 55 Leg., 2d Sess. (Wash. 1999).
251. WASH. REv. CODE§ 50.20.050(4) (1998).
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situation created an "unreasonable hardship '21 2 on the employee to try
to maintain employment, and provide benefits immediately. In con-
trast, a third ALJ might find that a domestic violence situation does
not exist anywhere in RCW 50.20 as a good cause reason to leave
employment and may therefore deny benefits. This procedure of
carving out exceptions on the very same fact pattern leaves the
employer and employee both at a loss to predict the outcome of an eli-
gibility determination.
Finally, one of the most compelling reasons why this type of leg-
islation should be enacted is that it is good policy. It reflects the needs
of a labor force which is increasingly weighted with female workers
and recognizes the fact that domestic violence does impact the work-
place. An individual in a domestic violence situation should not have
to choose between staying with an abuser and risking his or her life,
and leaving employment and risking economic security.5 3 While
Washington provides a "leave to follow spouse to work" exemption, 214
quitting a job to leave a violent and abusive spouse is not "good
cause." This policy fails to discourage continued violence against
women, both in the home and the workplace.
C. Current Legislative Effort in Washington
An experienced coalition of domestic violence and employee
rights advocates in Washington 255 has proposed legislation for the
1999 and 2000 legislative sessions that would amend RCW 50.20.050
252. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(3) (1998).
253. Although very few cases on this issue have had court review, the author finds it ironic
that the same state may find that a woman who is fired for absenteeism due to injuries from an
abusive husband is eligible for unemployment insurance, Gilbert v. Dept. of Corrections, 696 So.
2d 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), while a woman who resigns and leaves her husband to protect
herself and her children from abuse is not eligible for benefits, Hall v. Florida Unemployment
Appeals Commission, 697 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1997). Florida courts seem to be of the opinion that a
woman must stay at work, and with her abuser, until she loses her life or is fired. But see Saenz v.
Unemployment Appeals Commission, 647 So. 2d 283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a
claimant who was physically attacked by the supervisor's jealous girlfriend who was allowed on
the work-site was entitled to benefits because the employer failed to provide the claimant with a
work environment free from reasonably foreseeable physical harm).
254. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(c) (1998).
255. The Unemployment Law Project, the Washington State Coalition Against Domestic
Violence, Columbia Legal Services, the Northwest Women's Law Center, and the Washington
Coalition Against Sexual Assault, among others, drafted H.B. 1294. This legislation was pro-
posed during the 1998-1999 legislative session. This legislative coalition is currently in the
process of drafting similar legislation for the 1999-2000 legislative session.
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to provide unemployment compensation benefits to victims of domes-
tic violence who leave work to obtain safety.256
The 1998-1999 bill proposed that domestic violence claimants
who are awarded unemployment compensation benefits need not be
able, available, and actively seeking work in order to remain eligible
for continued benefits.217 The current bill will do the same.2"8  Both
bills attempt to alleviate some of the problems faced by domestic vio-
lence victims when they attempt to obtain safety for themselves and
their families, by recognizing that domestic violence is work-related
and deserves to be a good cause reason to leave employment. This bill
256. The 1998-2000 and 1999-2000 bills include domestic violence in WASH. REV. CODE
§ 50.20.050(2) (1998), which lists good cause reasons for voluntary quits. Both bills provide, in
pertinent part, that
An individual shall not be considered to have left work voluntarily without good cause
when: (d) the separation was necessary to protect the claimant or the claimant's
immediate family members from domestic violence, as defined under RCW
26.50.010, or stalking, as defined under RCW 9A.46.110. Protection is evidenced by:
(1) Going into hiding or relocating or attempting to relocate; (ii) Actively pursuing
legal protection or remedies; or (iii) Participating in psychological, social, or religious
counseling to assist the claimant in ending domestic violence or dealing with the
results of stalking so as to resume work.
257. Both bills amend WAH. REV. CODE § 50.20.010 (1998), which lists benefit eligibility
conditions and provides that
An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive waiting period credits or bene-
fits with respect to any weeks in his or her eligibility period only if the commissioner
finds that: (7) The claimant has qualified under RCW 50.20.050(2)(d) and the claim-
ant is temporarily unable to actively search for work because the claimant is seeking
safety or relief for the claimant or the claimant's immediate family members from
domestic violence or stalking. The claimant is deemed to have fulfilled the require-
ments of subsection (3) of this section [to be able to work, available for work, and
actively seeking suitable work] for up to twelve weeks while seeking safety or relief by:
(i) Going into hiding or relocating or attempting to relocate; (ii) Obtaining or receiv-
ing medical treatment; (iii) Actively pursuing legal protection or remedies; or (iv)
Participating in psychological, social, or religious counseling to assist the claimant in
ending domestic violence or dealing with the results of stalking so as to resume work.
258. WASH. H.B. 1901, 56th Leg., 2nd Sess. (1999). The proposed legislation, which
failed this past session, would have established a domestic violence compensation program under
current unemployment compensation statutory provisions. A domestic violence victim who is
unemployed as a result of domestic violence would have been eligible for unemployment insur-
ance if she was otherwise eligible for unemployment benefits but temporarily unable to search for
work because she was seeking safety or relief for herself or her immediate family from domestic
violence or stalking. Additionally, the legislation provided that the benefits be limited to situa-
tions in which:
(I) the domestic violence occurred within the previous two years;
(II) the domestic violence can be established by medical records, court documents,
policy records, or a certified counselor; and
(III) the domestic violence victim demonstrates that she is taking action by:
(i) relocating or attempting to relocate due to domestic violence;
(ii) obtaining or receiving medical treatment due to domestic violence;
(iii) pursuing legal protection; or
(iv) participating in counseling or support activities.
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provides essential economic support to those individuals who wish to
leave their abusers and protect themselves and their families from
further violence. Enacting this legislation could save lives.
The proposed legislation is the result of a collaborative effort
among the Unemployment Law Project, the Labor Council, the
Northwest Women's Law Center, the Washington State Coalition
Against Domestic Violence, Columbia Legal Services, Northwest Jus-
tice Project, and private individuals. These groups have had extensive
experience representing domestic violence victims and unemployment
claimants. It is the experienced judgment of this coalition that many
women do not leave employment and seek safety because they would
be unable to provide for themselves or their children.
VI. CONCLUSION AND NOTES FOR ADVOCATES
In summary, this type of legislation reflects the needs of our
current work force and helps to prevent some of the violence against
women that is pervasive in our society. Although providing benefits
to these claimants costs money, it is money well invested. Allowing an
employee to seek safety helps eliminate some workplace violence and
reduces other costs to the employer, such as lost productivity and
excessive absenteeism. Indeed, some courts have indicated a willing-
ness to allow benefits and charge them to the employer when the
employer either fired an employee due to domestic violence or allowed
violence to enter into the workplace and failed to adequately protect
the employee.259
The best advice for claimants who have left work to escape
domestic violence and who are now seeking unemployment compen-
sation benefits is to complete the initial application for benefits,
regardless of whether the claimant believes he or she is eligible. Even
without specific legislative provisions for a domestic violence situa-
tion, claimants may receive benefits based on other provisions of the
unemployment compensation statute.26° In fact, at least one ESD
259. See Gilbert v. Dep't of Corrections, 696 So. 2d 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Saenz
v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 647 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1994).
260. See, e.g., Middleton v. Empl. Sec. Dept., No. 95-2-02078-7 (Wash. Employment Sec.
Dep't Office of Admin. Hearings, July 1, 1996) (finding a claimant could be eligible for benefits
under "illness" or "disability" provision of WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b) (1998) after she
quit employment because her abusive partner followed her to work and threatened to kill her);
but see In re R.R., Docket No. 1-06815 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't, commissioner's decision
1981) (holding that a claimant who left work to flee abusive husband with small child did not
leave work due to work related conditions and thus did not have good cause to voluntarily quit).
See also Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Unemployment Compensation for Victims of Domestic Violence,
30 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 209 (1996). Ruckelshaus provides a good overview of methods
attorneys could use to help claimants obtain benefits absent a statutory provision.
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
commissioner's decision indicates that a stalking situation at work
might be good cause to quit employment.261
The solution for advocates is far from easy. If the current legis-
lation does not pass, decisions regarding eligibility for unemployment
benefits depends upon the individual ALJ who hears the case. Legis-
lation remains the most appropriate solution. The innovative
approach used by New Hampshire might be instructive for future
legislative attempts. In 1996 New Hampshire Legal Assistance
(NHLA), which had tried to pass similar legislation for years, used a
new two-step approach.
First, NHLA proposed a study bill on the contingent work-
force.262 Because the bill did not cost anything, it had little difficulty
passing. An advisory council was appointed and directed by the leg-
islature to study, take public testimony, and make recommendations
on various unemployment insurance issues, including domestic rea-
sons for leaving work.2 63 At the domestic violence and unemployment
insurance public hearing, compelling testimony was presented from
actual victims of domestic violence who had lost jobs due to their
situations.2 64  The advisory council made several recommendations
regarding New Hampshire's unemployment compensation program;
among them was the recommendation that domestic violence be good
cause to leave work and remain eligible for unemployment insur-
ance.26 5
Second, armed with these recommendations and bolstered by the
credibility garnered by the studies, NHLA proposed legislation tai-
lored to the recommendations. NHLA built contacts with the busi-
ness community during the hearings process and encountered little
difficulty in passing the legislation.266 This sort of approach is desir-
able because an advisory council can examine many different issues
261. See In re B.J., Docket No. 9-09554, Docket No 1-571 (Wash. Employment Sec.
Dep't, commissioner's decision 1982) (affirnming the ALJ's determination that the claimant was
eligible for benefits under RCW 50.20.050(3) and had good cause to leave work because the
claimant quit to prevent the unwanted attentions of a supervisor); see also In re A.S., Docket No.
01-1998-81296 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't, commissioner's decision 1999) (finding that a
claimant had good cause to leave employment when a customer which claimant had briefly
talked to, presented the claimant with a "gift" of an evening gown and lace thong underpants and
his phone number because requiring the claimant to continue employment at her workplace
would constitute an "unreasonable hardship" since the customer worked across the street and
had easy access to the claimant).
262. Memorandum from New Hampshire Legal Assistance to Employment Law Task
Force (June 11, 1998) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
263. Memorandum, supra note 262, at 4-5.
264. Id. at 5.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 6.
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relating to unemployment insurance, including domestic violence and
the needs of the current labor force.
